‘Urbanisation of Everybody’, Institutional Imperatives, and Social Transformation in Pakistan

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Cultural change and social transformation are essential elements of the process of development. They complement and sustain economic growth. Economic historians acknowledge that the rise of the West from poverty to wealth was as much the result of improvements in trade, savings, investment and productivity as of emerging norms of thrift, trust, specialisation, rationality and contractual relations [Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986)]. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that economic development is essentially a phenomenon of cultural change.

The recognition of the role of cultural and social factors in economic growth has led to a subtle revision of the terminology from ‘economic development’ to the adjectiveless term ‘development’ or the fully spelled out title of economic and social development. Yet this acknowledgement has remained largely on the conceptual plane. It has not been translated into policies and programmes to deliberately set the direction of cultural change and define the alignment of social organisation. Development strategies have, by and large, treated social and cultural factors as exogenous variables. This is true of development planning in general and in particular of its practice in Pakistan. In fifty years of economic planning in Pakistan, little attention has been paid to the social and cultural aspects of development.

This paper argues that the neglect of social and cultural factors has created an institutional lag between spatial, economic and technological sectors on the one hand and the cultural, social and political institutions, on the other. Pakistan is predominantly an urbanised society spatially and demographically, but its social institutions and cultural ethos remain rooted in traditions of rural origins.¹ This

¹Pakistan’s social institutions and political behaviours are often described to be ‘feudal’ in norms and structures. This appellation is an indicator of the acknowledgement of rural influences.

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divergence between economic and spatial organisations and social and cultural institutions has impeded the process of sustained development. This is the proposition argued in this paper.

**INSTITUTIONAL BASES OF DEVELOPMENT**

The political economy of development is a theoretical tradition that has long emphasised the role of social structure and cultural norms in economic production and distribution. Classical economists, Smith, Malthus, Mills and Marx analysed economic systems in terms of social and political institutions. In contemporary theories, the Modernisation paradigm explicitly links economic growth with cultural change, political development and behavioural transformations. A classical formulation of the Modernisation paradigm was used by Gunnar Myrdal in his monumental study, *Asian Drama* to analyse the prospects of economic development in South Asia, including Pakistan [Myrdal (1968)]. Drawing on South Asian statements of development goals and approaches, Myrdal articulated a set of Modernisation ideals as the criteria for policy analysis. Among those ideals were (a) rationality, (b) the improvement of the host of undesirable conditions, (c) rise of productivity, (d) rise of level of living, (e) social and economic equalisation, (f) improved institutions and attitudes such as efficiency, diligence, orderliness, punctuality, honesty, enterprise, integrity and self-reliance, etc., (g) national consolidations, (h) national independence, (i) political democracy, (j) democracy at grassroots, (k) social discipline versus democratic planning [Myrdal (1968), pp. 57–67].

This list of the guiding principles includes not only economic criteria such as the rise of productivity and equitable distribution, but also the political, cultural and social conditions without which development is presumed to be unrealisable on a sustained basis. There are disagreements about the significance of particular items on Myrdal’s list, but his arguments and approach have not been disputed, namely, the stress on political, cultural and social reforms along with economic and technological progress. His definition of development as “upward movement of the whole system” exemplifies this conception [Myrdal (1968), p. 1868].

On application, the Modernisation paradigm turned out to be an unabashed form of Westernisation. It envisaged transposing Western values, roles and institutions to the Third World [McClelland (1961) and Apter (1965)]. The reaction to the Modernisation paradigm was largely conditioned by its agenda of Westernisation. Yet its message that institutional change is necessary for economic development keeps on resurfacing both in theories and practice of development planning.

The dependency theories, the notions of ‘New Economic Order’ and the ‘World System’, though insistently critical of the Modernisation theories, laid stress on political systems and international relations as the fountaineers of underdevelopment. The political and social variables, rather than purely economic factors, remained centrepieces of the development strategies in these theoretical formulations.
The combination of World Bank’s clout as the prime financier of development with its proclaimed interest in guiding development policies have given it a preponderant position in the development discourse. The World Bank’s policy agenda has become the source of development models and its programmes have swept through the world, in wave after wave, to implement successive formulations. Its conceptions of development strategies swung from the capital-output ratio based models to the import substitution strategies and subsequently the human resource development approach over a span of about a decade (mid 1960s to mid 1970s). The protest movements of late 1960s in many countries of the world pointed out the neglect of ‘equity’ in the international development approaches. McNamara’s Mia Culpa for the World Bank and a new focus of its programmes on basic needs and the poverty alleviation underlined the human dimensions of economic development. The subsequent rise of the Human Development Approach is a logical consequence of the realisation that economic growth cannot be separated from distributional justice and enhancement of human welfare. Altogether the economic development strategies have cyclically emphasised and ignored political and social factors. Yet every phase of preoccupation with purely economic factors has brought home the realisation that social institutions are the foundations of economic organisation. This institutionalist view is reflected in successive decades such as in the works of Adelman and Morris (1967); Chenery (1974) and Olson (1983).

The neo-liberal ideology of 1980s may be reducing public role in development but paradoxically it is also pushing forward the agenda of institutional reforms to introduce democratic practices, decentralise governments, increase the role of women, improve sustainable management of environment and denationalisation of production and finance, etc. This is the new agenda of development. It has been termed as the “neo-institutional approach”. From Putnam’s social capital to North’s transaction costs and Sen’s entitlements are ideas that bring political, social and cultural factors to the core of the development strategies [Putnam (1993); North (1989) and Sen (1981)]. One could say that the institutional reform agenda resurrects the Modernisation paradigm, especially for those political and social institutions that underlie economic transactions, i.e., democratic governance, property rights, contract law, fiscal and financial discipline, privatisation and decentralisation of governmental operations, etc. These institutions are assumed to be universal in scope and not merely Western artifacts.

THE PHENOMENON OF INSTITUTIONAL LAG

Despite the focus on (some) institutions as objects of reform for economic development, the institutional approach does not aim at, for example, realignment of family and marriage, work, labour, community, ethnicity and organisational culture. Yet these social institutions and cultural norms define the structure of property, contracts, taxes, local government and other institutions undergoing market
transactions. The neo-institutional reforms are focussing almost exclusively on transactional institutions. They are not likely to bring about necessary efficiency and equality without some deliberate efforts to realign the social and cultural systems. The neglect of social and cultural development precipitates the phenomenon of institutional lag whereby material, physical or technological elements of institutions change, while political, social and cultural elements remain unaffected, resulting in different institutions or various segments of the same institutions out of balance with each other. The phenomenon of institutional lag in cultural systems was identified in the hypothesis of cultural lag long ago by Ogburn [Ogburn (1922)].

Institutional lag is impeding economic growth. Economic development requires parallel changes in economic, political, social and cultural institutions, both at the macro and micro levels. The reform agenda should extend to social and cultural systems as well as the political and economic organisations. Without the former, the latter will be another failed initiative. This proposition will be examined through the case study of urbanisation in Pakistan.

**TWO PROCESSES OF URBANISATION IN PAKISTAN**

By census definition, about one-third (32.5 percent in 1998) of Pakistan’s population lives in metropolitan or municipal corporations, municipal or town committees or cantonments, namely in urban places. The urban population is increasing at the rate of 3.45 percent per year compared to 2.24 percent of the rural population. No matter what measure is used, cross-sectional or longitudinal, the proportion of Pakistan’s population living in urban areas is exploding, to use a popular metaphor, so are the number and areas of the designated urban places. This is the description of conventional urban growth resulting from the population increase in cities and towns. Its structure and consequences are well known.

The second process of urbanisation is unrecognised and is working its way largely unnoticed. Yet it is building up the momentum of social change that equals, perhaps exceeds, the much discussed urban crisis. This is urbanisation through the densification of rural areas under the population pressure. Villages burst out to scatter homesteads and hamlets across the landscape, conversely homesteads coalesce together to form bands of linear settlements. One way or the other extensive countryside turns into a continuous series of settlements, interspersed with towns and cities. This is the settlement system emerging in rural regions of urban level densities, i.e., 400 persons per sq. km. This density criteria is an almost universal measure to define urban areas, particularly in the newly urbanising regions. It is assumed that at this density the spatial organisation and residential land economy of an area assumes urban characteristics. Rural regions which have reached or surpassed this level of density have been called Ruralopolises [Qadeer (2000)]. They are a distinct form of settlement system, urban in spatial organisation and land economy, but agrarian in economic organisation.
The urban level density in a rural setting is the defining characteristics of ruralopolitan areas. The high density is a transformative force. It changes the spatial organisation, the settlement pattern, the form and structure of villages and the land economy, including the provision of house lots.

High density has three distinct levels of impact: (i) its primary impact is on the provision of residential land, though the competition for agricultural land is also strong. The land for living begins to turn from a family entitlement to an individual property, from a relatively accessible to scarce goods. High density fills up village sites, catalyses the formation of satellite settlements and pockmarks the landscape with homesteads, hamlets, roadside stalls, changing the settlement pattern and creating a diffused band of human settlement that stretches along highways and roads. (ii) The secondary effect of high density affect the provision of community facilities and services, e.g. water supply, drains, streets and paths, etc. They evolve from incrementally and privately provided goods to collective goods meant to be provided on the community-wide basis. These facilities and services require 10–50 percent additional land per housing unit for external facilities and services. Also they necessitate formal organisational and management structures for their provision. Some form of local administration, community based or publicly mandated, become a necessity. Overall, these impacts require transformation of community management from informal practices to formal institutions. On all these scores, the density precipitates functional needs which may or may not be fulfilled. (iii) The tertiary impact of high density appears in the form of changing economic and functional bases of all levels of settlement hierarchy. The high density precipitates thresholds for schools, dispensaries, stores, play fields, land use and environmental regulations, public health and safety measures, for example. These activities and functions become necessary and wherever they materialise, they change the character of the corresponding settlements. Villages become towns and towns turn into veritable cities. All in all, these system-wide impacts lay ground for the emergence of wide range of non-agricultural activities, collective goods and organisational and political changes in rural regions.

Altogether the three levels of the density’s impact realign the spatial organisation, settlement pattern and residential land economy towards urban forms. These are processes of urban transformation. The spatial and technical changes occur and the needs for organisational and institutional transformation are precipitated. Whether those needs are fulfilled depends on the parallel development of social, political and cultural institutions. The process of spatial and institutional change set in motion by high density is the manifestation of urbanisation through implosion. The settlement system emerging from this process is Ruralopolis.

**RURALOPOLISES IN PAKISTAN**

Map1 shows two clusters of contiguous districts in Pakistan whose rural population densities are 400 persons or more per sq. km. These are Pakistan’s
PAKISTAN
Ruralopolises:
High Density Rural Districts
1998
ruralopolises. The larger one is in Punjab spread across the eastern half of the province—from Sialkot to Multan, an area 55,738 sq. km. It is a densely settled region dotted with cities, towns and sprawled villages and hamlets. In this region, one can travel along any road and never be out of sight of a house, village or workshop. Towns and cities may be distant but the human settlement is always nearby. From Gujrat to Lahore and then onward to Multan, one is always in urban presence. Spatially this area is one extended urbanising region, one ruralopolis. The second ruralopolis is centred around Peshawar and extends across Peshawar Valley and beyond into the lower reaches of Swat Valley. Karachi to Hyderabad is already a corridor of urban settlements.

The rural population of these two ruralopolises was about 31.3 million in 1998. Adding this to the urban population of Pakistan (42.5 million), means that about 56.5 percent of Pakistan’s population is urbanised by one or the other process of urbanisation.

**RURAL-URBAN CONTINUUM AND URBANISATION OF EVERYBODY**

While urbanisation, not just city living, has enveloped a majority of Pakistan’s population, a sizeable minority making the rural parts of arid western Punjab, Upper Sind, Balochistan and southern NWFP are also touched by urban ways of life at least materially. While urbanisation is largely a spatial phenomenon, urbanism as a (urban) way of life is diffusing all across the land.

Pakistan’s rural and urban communities are two sides of the national culture, recapitulating in varying intensities its societal institutions. The cash economy, the centralised state and the transportation and communication technologies have bridged rural and urban differences. The cities are being ruralised with the migration from villages, and conversely villages are being infiltrated by motor bicycles, videos, tea shops, snooker clubs, telephones and workshops, namely the cultural artifacts normally associated with urban living. The rural in Pakistan is increasingly synonymous with an occupational specialisation namely agriculture, and its related industries. The purely rural social patterns and cultural practices are largely the sub-culture of agricultural classes. Thus the rural and urban differences are essentially specific sectoral and class configurations of social institutions and cultural patterns. The sum total of this argument is that the purely rural population is a minority in Pakistan and even it is coming under urban influences. The majority of Pakistan is urbanised spatially and technologically. Altogether Pakistan can be aptly described in Abu-Lughod’s phrase “Urbanisation of Everybody” [Abu-Lughod (1991)].

**IMPERATIVES OF URBANISATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE**

Urbanisation is primarily a process of spatial restructuring. It concentrates people and their activities in a limited space. This concentration (density effect) increases social interaction, interlinks economic activities, and precipitates
interdependencies and external economies and diseconomies. These processes in turn affect locational parameters and necessitate a whole new range of facilities, services, laws, customs and practices. The dense web of human interactions requires transformation of social relations, economic organisation, and even moral order. It requires collectivisation of many goods and services that in sparsely settled non-urban settings are either not needed or privately provided. It redefines the bases of land tenures and property rights. On all these scores, urbanisation is simultaneously an expression and a catalyst for social and economic changes. The efficiency and welfare of urban communities depend on such social changes and restructuring of institutions. These are the imperatives of urbanisation.

There are urban areas where imperatives of urbanisation are not fulfilled for a long period. Western cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, such as Dickens’ London, were in such a state. The current urban crisis in the Third World is more a symptom of the institutional lag than of the resource limitation. In the same vein, as Pakistan urbanises, it needs to deliberately promote the development of institutions and organisations appropriate for urban ways of life. What are these institutional imperatives and how is the Pakistani society lagging in their development are analysed in the following sections.

Reforming Urban Land System

Undoubtedly the physical base of land, namely the earth’s surface, remains unchanged but the attributes required for urban uses differ considerably from those valued in rural economies, e.g. location, accessibility to linked activities, community facilities and services and the property rights [Qadeer (1981)]. Almost all these attributes arise from interlocking externalities of the area-wide and neighbourhood activities. They arise from ‘outside’ a site and are not part of its natural endowment. The use and value of a piece of urban land depend on its relative location in relation to sites where complementary activities are being carried out. Its use and value also depend on the provision of roads, drains, schools, electricity, waste disposal, safety and amenity, etc., in sum the umbrella of collective goods, services and organisations surrounding a site. Thus a private use of an urban site is not viable without complementary uses of public lands in infrastructure and overhead services. In Western cities, almost as much land is needed outside a house to service it as is within the boundaries of its site [Darin-Drabkin (1977)]. My study of the ruralopolitan areas suggests that 10–50 percent of additional land is needed in public uses for every unit of residential land, the ratio depending on the size of settlement [Qadeer (2000)].

This description of the nature of urban land is meant to point out that urbanisation transforms the basis of land’s utility and value and consequently the scope of its ownership. An owner of urban land is, for example, not free to build a slaughter house or a fireworks factory in the middle of a residential neighbourhood, because his/her actions can imperil the safety or health of his neighbours. Similarly a
private piece of land is worthless if it is not linked to streets, drains, water supply or police protection, namely collective goods of some kind. Thus private property in urban land is framed by public investment, regulations and neighbouring activities.

The urban land reforms require formalisation and restructuring of the bundle of rights constituting private property and complementary public interests in the use, value and disposition of land. The urban land system also includes surveying and registration procedures, zoning and building regulations and property taxation. All in all, the urban land system is more deeply steeped in externalities (of other’s activities), collective goods and public powers. Pakistan’s ‘Patwar’ system of land management and the agrarian notions of ownership and tenancy have little relevance in urban settings.

Urbanisation necessitates the restructuring of land system. Western societies underwent such institutional changes in a deliberate but evolutionary manner. In England, for example, the abolition of feudal tenancies (1882) were followed by eight land acts in 1925, to enact modern urban land tenures, complemented by town planning acts and public health legislation.

The urbanisation of Pakistan has precipitated the imperative of institutional change in the land sector. Yet even the rural land reforms, largely redistribution of ownership rights, have not been vigorously implemented. The notion of restructuring urban land system is not even on the policy agenda. The symptoms of the institutional lag in land systems are all around, namely wasteful and conflicting patterns of land use, the prevalence of encroachment and squatters, the uncertainties of land titles and transfers, the operations of Qabza groups and the politics of plots.

The Collectivisation of Private Needs and Systematisation of Public Goods

Urbanisation builds up a web of interdependencies. For example, effluents and garbage dumped outside one’s house spread filth on the neighbour’s doorsteps and vice versa, a situation common in Pakistan’s cities. At the doorsteps of houses worth crores of rupees are piles of rotting garbage, contrasting private splendour with civic squalor. Obviously the livability of a home is indivisible from the garbage disposal of others in the neighbourhood and vice versa. These interdependencies, arising partially from the density of houses and work places, necessitate the provision of collective goods.

Facilities and services which are largely private goods in low-density rural settings turn into collective needs as the density increases. The latrine is a case in point. In sparsely settled rural areas, ‘going out in the fields’ is a common practice, but it is increasingly not feasible as the seclusion of fields fades away with the increasing concentration of people. In dense settlements, the ‘hole in the ground’ inside a house becomes a private latrine. Yet as the density further increases, the holding tanks and periodic pumping out of the effluents become a necessity. At
about 100–150 houses per sq. km., septic tanks cease to be effective. At this density, private latrines have to be connected to sewers and drains. Thus with increasing density a latrine evolves from a purely private to a semi-collective facility requiring collective infrastructure for the disposal of effluents. A similar sequence can be traced for paths, streets, water supply, open spaces, and even soft services such as numbering of houses and naming of streets, police protection, law and order or public welfare for the aged, the widows and orphans of a community. The crystallisation of private facilities into collective goods, regardless of their availability or not, is the result of urbanisation.

The provision of collective goods, public or private, involves both technological and organisational resources. For example, not only are sewers and drains to be designed and built but also systematic procedures for recovering costs, managing use and maintaining the network have to be instituted. Whether it is community water supply, waste disposal, fire protection or traffic control, making provisions for urban facilities and services require cultural and organisational change. The traditional and personalised ways of making decisions are not suitable to produce and manage collective goods.

Urbanisation institutes a new form of community life, dependent on collective goods, shared interests and formal organisations. An urban community remains unfulfilled and dysfunctional without appropriate organisational and cultural changes for the provision of collective good.

**Institutionalisation of Responsive Local Governance**

The complex networks of interrelations and transactions arising from the concentration of people and activities cannot be sustained with informal and customary modes of local governance, characteristics of rural communities. Urbanisation precipitates a need for formal, representative and impersonal governing institutions. As urbanisation spreads, the requisite of the rule-based and responsive local government becomes all the more urgent.

The range and complexity of functions required of local government increase in parallel with the intensity of urbanisation. Such functions include coordination of specialised operations, production and management of collective goods, taxation and financing of facilities and services, and institutionalising people’s participation in decision-making.

The Western experience bears out the proposition that urbanisation necessitates responsive local governance. As Britain, USA and Canada, for example, were urbanised by the late 19th and early 20th century, faced with expanding and complex public responsibilities, they had to institute modern and representative local governments. The Dickensian living conditions, the periodic epidemics, industrial pollution and exploited labour and festering slums were the alarm bells of the institutional break down. All three countries, and other European states, enacted
series of legislation, complemented by numerous social movements to usher an era of urban reforms in early 1900s. The YMCA, Salvation Army, and Women's Institutes are examples of social reform movements to promote social change. The merchants and industrialists joined hands with social reformers to press for citizens’ participation, town planning and public health and professionalisation of municipal services. The urbanisation crystallised the needs for urban reforms and the states fulfilled these demands.

For the Third World, the imperative of responsive local government has been lately acknowledged by the World Bank and other international agencies. The development of local government, institutions and devolution of the relevant functions and authority to local levels is a part of the policy agenda and loan conditionalities of the World Bank.

The urbanisation of Pakistan has not yet led to the development of effective and modern local governance institutions. Local governments have remained a preserve of Baradaris and clan, on the one hand, and subordinated to provincial bureaucracies and district administration, on the other. They are both ineffective and corrupt. There has been no attempt to organise them in a modern idiom.

Urban governance requires institutionalisation of interest communities and impersonal decision-making processes. The lag in the development of such institutions is probably the most significant impediment in the progress of urbanised Pakistan.

**Restructuring Local Economies**

The push towards urbanisation may come from the population pressure, as is the case in Pakistan, but it turns into a force of economic transformation, particularly at the local and regional levels. A sectoral shift in economic production from primary to secondary, tertiary and even quaternary sectors parallels the spread and intensification of urbanisation. The local economic base is broadened with increasing specialisation of activities, division of labour and forward-backward linkages among the production activities.

An urban area is also the site of consumption for higher order goods and services, namely surgeries, specialist’s medical care, courts, fashionable clothes and jewelry, movies, theater and sports, etc. Altogether urbanisation propels local economies towards specialised lines of production and consumption. Yet this transformation of local economies is not a predestined process. It is nourished and sustained by corresponding restructuring of local economic organisations and public institutions. Without the latter developments, the former process remains in suspension.

An urban economy emerges from the interlinkages among specialised activities and gains in efficiency through common infrastructure and services. It benefits from ‘economies of scale and agglomeration and from the proximity of
labour, capital, and technology’ [World Bank (1991), p. 34]. Such spatial economies can only be taken advantage of if infrastructure of both hard and soft services is developed, i.e. roads, land use, control, traffic management, telephones, equitable taxation, efficient banking facilities, market regulations, as well as trust, objective information and dealings by rules. Without such infrastructure and institutions, the productivity of firms declines (Ibid: 37).

Pakistan is severely lacking in these facilities and services all across the country, but their inadequacy is striking in cities. The power and water shortages, traffic grid locks, telephone breakdowns, housing shortages, and crime are symptoms of infrastructural deficiencies. Equally detrimental for local economic growth are highly structured and almost ‘sanctioned’ practices of kickbacks, political and administrative corruption, clannish organisations and personalised modes of transaction, poor skills and wasteful procedures, etc. All in all, the social and cultural institutions undergirding the economic organisation and transactional practices have to be restructured to promote norms of impersonal dealings, i.e., trust (in) and reliability, rationality and punctuality and efficiency and accountability. These norms were recognised by Myrdal. The urban experience necessitates the institutional reorganisation in the social and cultural substratum of local economic organisations. The World Bank has recognised the need for institutional reforms primarily in market promoting structures. Yet the institutional lag extends to the socio-cultural underpinnings of the transactional institutions. Restructuring the institutional bases of economic organisations is as important as the agenda of structural reforms.

Reforming Social Institutions and Cultural Practices

Urbanisation has long been recognised as a catalyst for changes in social structure, cultural norms and human behaviours. Its concentrated population and commercial-industrial mode of production necessitate vast changes in social relations and people’s interactions. No longer can the intimacy and emotional intensity of face-to-face relations be extended to everybody one comes across in a day’s work. Much of daily dealings are with people not related by kinship or friendship. They have to be segmental and secondary in sentiments. Similarly, bonds of locality weaken and the basis of community life shifts as people’s occupations take them away to other places. The caste and clan ties are overlaid with class and occupational interests. The beliefs, occupations and experiences of one generation are of little value for the next confronting new situations. All in all, urbanisation lays the bases for the realignment of social organisation and the redefinition of social relations as well as cultural norms. Urban living requires punctuality, objectivity and impersonalisation (of dealings) for its efficient functioning. Without, such behavioural changes, the orderliness and efficiency cannot be maintained in daily routines of large concentrations of population. The village norms and patterns of behaviour are not functional and efficient in urban settings.
The social transformation that comes with the emergence of cities was noted by Ibn Khaldun (1967) in the 14th century. He equated civilisation with cities and contrasted it with the Bedouin way of life. The sociological theory has a long tradition of differentiating between rural and urban social organisations. Weber (1905); Tonnies (1887) and Simmel (1905) developed models of rural-urban differences, and their formulations culminated in the seminal theory of Wirth about “urbanism as a way of live” (1938). He contended that the size, density and heterogeneity of urban population lead to impersonalisation of relations (and dealings), specialisation of activities and secularisation of life [Wirth (1938)]. The Western experiences of urbanisation affirmed these theories, leading to their generalisation into deterministic explanations. Modernisation theorists incorporated the deterministic perspectives of urbanism and maintained that the envisaged social changes will follow almost automatically from urbanisation [Apter (1965); Lerner (1958) and McClelland (1961)].

The Third World’s experiences of urbanisation show that the urban social institutions do not emerge by themselves. They have to be developed and nurtured. The development experience of Pakistan points towards the social costs of institutional lag.

In Pakistan, urbanisation has eroded kinship ties to some degree and introduced communities of interest, but these socio-cultural changes remain fragmentary and unrealised. Pakistan’s social organisation and cultural norms are being ruralised as much as they are being urbanised. The mass migration of rural populations to cities and the entrenchment of power structures in clan, Baradari and family has ‘arrested’ the process of social transformation in Pakistan. A few examples illustrate this point.

Most economic transactions and social interactions proceed in the medium of personalised dealings. ‘Who knows whom’ is the rule and even if in a situation one cannot mobilise some personal ties, one immediately proceeds to forge such relations by appealing to primordial bonds of ethnicity, language, religion, sect or region. This is the pervasive phenomenon of personalising the impersonal. Most sustained dealings are lodged in personal ties and exchanges.

The political parties, professional and occupational organisation, even the ranks and cadres of the civil services and the military develop sub-stratum of brotherhood ties. They turn into social networks reminiscent of Baradaris and tribes. The prestigious DMG (CSP) group has long behaved as a tribe, mutually supporting and even arranging marriages among sons and daughters. The army, the traders associations and, even, trade unions operate as extended families and clans.

Even the charity and good deeds largely follow one’s obligations to relatives, neighbours, clan, sect or religious communities. The friendships are consolidated by reciprocated sentiments of brotherhood. All in all, normatively, organisationally, and symbolically, Pakistan’s transactional institutions are based on norms and values of
personalised dealings and primary relations. Whereas the urban economic, social and administrative functions require impersonal, rules-based and interest-led interactions. The development of social institutions incorporating urban norms is lagging. The so-called feudalism in Pakistan is not limited to villages and tribes, but its institution and values permeate bureaucracies, political parties, universities and corporations. Most urban organisations are hollow institutions, imbibing modern forms but functioning on the traditional norms. The underside of these organisations is structured like clans and patriarchal families.

The social institutions and cultural ethos, required for equitable and efficient functioning of urban societies, emerge out of the on-going social processes as well as from social movements and social legislations. The Western experience bears out this proposition. The social transformation of Western societies in the days of their early industrialisation was often the result of public acts and initiatives. For example, the British enacted means-tested pensions in 1880, insurance for sick and unemployed workers in 1911, family allowances in 1945 and the National Health Service in 1946. Similarly, the child welfare societies, the suffragette movement, the anti-slavery league are examples of social movements agitating for the reform of family and community institutions. Yet the state created political space for such movements to grow. The sum total of public and communal measures was the rise of nuclear families, tolerance and individual rights which in turn shaped the modern economic organisation. The organisational structure of urban economy evolves out of the norms and values nurtured in institutions such as the family, the school and the community. The reforming of these social institutions is an imperative of urban development.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Development is a multi-track process: economic growth, political development, social transformation and cultural change. All tracks are interlinked, none advances very far without the others. This is a long held assumption, validated by development theories as well as historical experiences. The World Bank’s agenda of institutional reforms is the current expression of this assumption. It also forms the premise of this paper.

Urbanisation is an illustrative example of the process of development. It encapsulates all elements of modern development. It is, therefore, an appropriate ground to observe the unfolding of the development process. I have used the urbanisation of Pakistan as a probe to uncover reasons for its inconsistent and unbalanced development.

Pakistan is an urbanised society spatially and materially. Both the implosion of population in rural areas and the explosion of population in cities have combined to create vast regions of human settlement where urban densities and spatial forms prevail. Urbanisation comes with its own institutional, organisational and
technological imperatives, e.g. changing bases of the land system, precipitation of needs for collective goods, infrastructure, public health and welfare and effective local government, reorganisation of local economies and the necessity of forging social institutions and cultural patterns appropriate for the interdependent living. This analysis suggests that Pakistan is deficient on all these imperatives.

A pervasive condition of the institutional lag has developed between the social, cultural and organisational institutions, on the one hand and the spatial, technological and material conditions on the other. Particularly stuck are the processes of social transformation and cultural change. The emergence of impersonal dealings, rules-based organisations, achievement and merit as the bases of social status, tolerance, thrift, trust and fulfillment through work as values undergridding organisational culture have been stalled. The urban (social) institutions and cultural patterns continue to be largely structured around the traditionalist norms and values forged in the agrarian milieu. Most urban institutions have highly patterned, parallel but unacknowledged structures, networks of favour exchanges and brotherhoods of mutual benefits, reminiscent of Baradaris and kinships. The lagging institutions and cultural practices drag down economic productivity, efficiency and equity. At political and sociological planes, the institutional lag is observable in what has been called the economy of affection, nepotism, corruption, personalisation of the impersonal, political instability and social strife. Pakistan’s development will remain episodal and unfulfilling, without the transformation of its social institutions and cultural change.

Briefly, Pakistan needs a deliberate and planned effort of social reform. It is a task that requires participation of individuals, communities and the state. Social movements for literacy, family planning, women and children’s rights, fair justice, minorities’ protection, community self-help, religious tolerance and labour unions, etc. have to be promoted. Such movements foster urban ethos and modern institutions as they did in Britain, the USA and other Western countries in the early 20th century. They are the part of a country’s society.

Correspondingly, the state-sponsored social legislation is required to lay the basis of a modern society through the welfare rights of the poor and the aged, land reforms, modernisation of family law, freedom of information act and social insurance for the unemployed, universal education and health insurance, administrative reforms and reorganisation of local and provincial authorities, citizens participation in public decision, etc. Most of these measures require legislative, political and administrative actions. They are affordable even by a poor country like Pakistan. They will bring about institutional changes which, in turn, will modernise Pakistan. Myrdal’s Modernisation Ideals are relevant even today. Their fulfillment promise prosperity and harmony in Pakistan.

REFERENCES
In this paper the author has highlighted some of the social, cultural and economic imbalances in the society by uncovering inconsistencies and lags in the process of development. To explain this he has taken the urbanisation process in Pakistan as an illustrative example of urban unfolding that is emerging from increasing population densities in vast rural areas that according to the author are symptomatically urban in many ways, thus adding to the high-density agglomerations that are already identified as urban. While the author’s main concern that Pakistan’s urbanised settlements are deficient in institutional, organisational and technological imperatives, including the need of deliberate and planned effort of social reform, is both interesting and an important policy concern, his argument in many respects mainly keeps the western model in consideration and does not address to the inherent positive values in some of the traditions and how these could be utilised to achieve the desired goal.

For any comparison to be made of urban and rural population within the context of development, parallels cannot be so easily drawn between the developed countries and developing countries by mixing up the definition with realities of developmental history and infrastructure as in Canada and U.S.A., and definitions without much of realities as in India or Philippines. For example population concentrations in Canada or U.S.A. have different age structures in the rural or urban areas with higher proportions of less dependent, higher aged, more educated population with increasing numbers with ‘ready-made’ young immigrants from other countries helping to keep the proportions of dependent population at lower levels. Such is certainly not the case for both rural and urban concentrations in a country like Pakistan, where population densities have much larger contributions of very young people due to sustained levels of high fertility, and the developments at individual and collective levels, both economically and socially have been very slow. The author’s contention that the high density of population is a “transformative force” is too simplistic and incomplete statement in explaining the developmental scenario in rural-urban developmental axis. Similarly the statement by the author that the settlement system emerging is “Ruralopolis” indicates that the population as a whole ignores the degenerational aspect of the institutions and social systems even in the rural concentrations due to rapid population growth, and frustrations creeping-in through information that becomes available by inter-personal communication and exposure to foreign and local media in particular the electronic media. The authors observation “that the purely rural population is a minority in Pakistan…” seems to have been made having in mind the perception of his childhood images of rural
verses the urban life. What has happened over time is that the present rural and present urban throughout the world including Pakistan, have been influenced by changes that have affected the life of the people both positively and negatively. For example the access to Television and Radio, and better transport communication had little positive impact to keep the air and water cleaner, which used to be the case in most of the rural and even in the urban areas. I totally agree with the author that the current urban crisis in the Third World is more a symptom of institutional lag than the resource limitation. However, the same applies to the population as a whole, not merely to its urban segments.

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