Regional (East-West/North-South) Cooperation and Peter Singer’s Ethics of Globalisation

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I open Peter Singer’s One World: The Ethics of Globalization to a ‘local’ and a ‘global’ text, and am thereby led to argue that problems of poverty, inequality, governance, corruption, transparency, tolerance, growth and welfare, and more generally of justice and freedom, be they economic or political, are not the monopoly or ward of a particular region, packages to be pried open by the language of economic theory alone. They rather demand an acknowledgement that an economy is also a society, a polity, a community, a collectivity in short; and a conceptual recognition by agents, albeit embodied with their own needs and desires, that is correspondingly capacious. Thus, to move beyond conception to fruition, theory, of necessity, can hardly ignore values garnered from the past, ethics, and therefore texts, local to the collectivity, that make its past come alive.

Let us realise the significance of this bitter truth and dedicate ourselves individually and collectively for the supreme duty of building a nation of cohesive and committed people.

(Sudruddin Hashwani 2004)

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1See Chairman’s Message on page 7 in Bonjour, an in-house publication of Pearl Continental Hotels, Summer 2004.
Now the twenty-first century faces the task of developing a suitable form of government for that single world. It is a daunting moral and intellectual challenge, but one we cannot refuse to take up. The future of the world depends on how we meet it.

(Peter Singer 2002)

I am convinced, and this is the reason for my optimism, that the world needs philosophy more than philosophy thinks. Philosophy is ill, it might be dying, but I am sure that the world (the world, neither a God nor a prophet, but the world) is saying to philosophy: ‘Get up and walk!’

(Alain Badiou 2003a)

In this lecture, I read three texts: a Chairman’s welcoming message to his hotel guests, a book on the ethics of globalisation, and an essay on the desire of philosophy—all with a view towards understanding how one “theorises” the ethical, as opposed to (say) the moral or the rational or the purposive or the legal, and thus to an implicit exploration of the dichotomies cooperation/competition, plan/market and spontaneity/design. But first, in thanking my hosts for this invitation, let me acknowledge that this is a lecture in honour and memory of Dr Mahbub-ul-Haq.

I did not know Dr Haq. I first heard him as a graduate student on the “seven sins of economic planning” at Yale’s Economic Growth Centre soon after the independence of Bangladesh. His lecture itself, despite its impressive clarity, perhaps because of it, was deeply pessimistic about the role of economics in the development of the so-called LDCs. Dr Haq spoke of going to Harry Johnson and to Joan Robinson for advice and an evaluation on what went wrong with planning in Pakistan, and that had led to war with India and a traumatic partition of the country. He talked of how, beyond “tea and sympathy”, he was faulted by both: him, for not being committed enough to neo-liberal market theory, and her, for being altogether too recklessly committed; one for not following closely enough the recommendations of the Harvard Advisory Group, and the other, for Pakistani planners “not being able to think for themselves”. I remember Carlos Diaz-Alejandro protesting passionately to Dr Haq that he was needlessly holding himself

2The final sentences of the final chapter questioningly titled A Better World?


4This prefatory section (and some other parts of this essay) remains in the precise form as read in Islamabad; I therefore let the inconsistency between the two characterisations of this text remain. In any case, this essay, in its overall conception, is based rather closely on my talk in Islamabad.

5The question arises as to why these texts in a consideration of regional cooperation? why enlist these two particular texts to understand what Professor Singer means by the term ethics? Whether the reader finds my choices compelling is something only she can answer by persisting to the end of the essay. However, ever since my reading of Marshall’s assertion that the “first duty of economists is to sit at the feet of businessmen and learn from them,” I have been looking for a suitable text by a businessman; see Khan (2004b), particularly the first epigraph.

6This was subsequently published, perhaps as part of a book.

7For what Robinson may possibly have in mind, see Venkataramani (1984), particularly the sections dealing with coaching by American leaders on how Pakistani leadership ought to consider primarily the interests of Pakistan.
up for blame; the task of an “expert in a free society” was simply to advise on the basis of his or her expertise and leave the responsibility to those who were to take the decisions, who had vested in them the authority to do so.

I was to meet Dr Haq cursorily three more times: once in 1976 under the insistence of Amartya Sen\(^8\) that I accompany him for a lunch scheduled with his classmate at the World Bank (Sen thought that I should get to know Dr Haq); another time, when I delivered Sen’s letter to then Finance Minister Haq as he inaugurated one of the meetings of this Society;\(^9\) and finally, at a meeting of this Society in which he spoke and participated. I recount these episodes not as a vain attempt to connect my name to his, simply to be touched by his obvious distinction, but to highlight two different enterprises, different worlds really, especially if they are to be viewed in terms of what I want to speak about today, each local and global in their own way: mine, a world of academia, of theory and theorems, of the arcane and ruthlessly-petty politics of publishing; his, a world of international organisations, of practice and policy as the back-and-forth of statistical indices, of the power-play of real, big-time politics. T. N. Srinivasan\(^10\) tried to bring us together in Pakistan, but this was never realised; I remember him telling me at his sixty-fifth birthday conference at Yale that Dr Haq was contemplating the start of a new university in Pakistan and emphasising the importance of bringing the two worlds of theory and practice together.\(^11\) And so, I did not really have the privilege of getting to know Dr Haq professionally or personally.

I wish to see this lecture as a kind of first step in overcoming this deficiency, to begin a study of an *oeuvre* that has led a Canadian Minister for International Cooperation to link, in a 1999 tribute, his name to that of Tagore and Gandhi, and to offer the following quotation from his work:\(^12\)

> Human security is not a concern with weapons. It is a concern with human dignity. In the last analysis,\(^13\) it is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, an ethnic tension that did not explode, a dissident who was not silenced, a human spirit that was not crushed.

\(^8\)The author of Sen (1999, 2000), among other works.
\(^9\)This lead to an amusing misunderstanding whereby Dr Haq initially saw my action as one of a “Sen *sifarish*”, leading him to say to me that he would do all that he could for me; a misunderstanding dispelled only after my assurance to him that I was coming to him simply as a postman rather than as a supplicant.
\(^10\)For references to TN’s work and its appreciation, see Ranis-Raut (2000).
\(^11\)TN thought that as one of the more senior academics in the USA of Pakistani origin, I may have something to contribute to such a University. For a proceeding of this Conference, including references to my work on a model of ethnic groups inspired by the Pakistani context, see Ranis-Raut (2000).
\(^12\)See the “Tribute to Mahbub-ul-Haq” offered on October 13, 1999 by Maria Minna on the occasion of the Mahbub-ul-Haq Commemorative Conference (available at http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida.ind.nsf/0/46be7153d163.) Minister Minna writes “We look forward to a dawn of a new day when the dream shared by Tagore and Gandhi and Mahbub becomes reality for all of the people of South Asia”.
\(^13\)This question of the “last analysis” will be an important marker for me, and I shall be coming to it often in the sequel; see Footnote (107) and its references.
For the moment, however, my desire to attend to Dr Haq’s work, now that this work is complete, has to remain in abeyance, only a desire and an aspiration; today I speak to you about that which I know, and a lot about that which I do not know.

I

I begin with the analysis of a text that in spite of its apparent simplicity, and its location as a welcome for guests at a Pakistani five-star hotel, raises in a succinct and wonderfully economic way some of the issues that I want to put on the table.14

I(a)

I begin with the first half of the first paragraph of Mr Sudruddin Hashwani’s text.15

For peaceful and harmonious social order, it is extremely vital that the gap between the affluent and the rest should be as narrow as possible. But if the situation is the other way around and not only this, this gap between the haves and the have-nots continues to increase, it portends a serious malaise in the society with all its implications of social and economic upheaval of grave magnitude. That would manifest as deteriorating law and order, increasing crime and diminishing sense of belonging to the nation.

In the very first sentence there are recognitions—better still, abilities to recognise differences—that I want to highlight: first, between social orders16 that are peaceful and harmonious as opposed to those that are not; and second, between the affluent and the non-affluent parts of a population. For the second, the formidable technical tools of the modern social sciences, the statistical sciences in particular, are indeed adequate; indices of affluence allow precise distinctions, or at least distinctions that can be publicly made, to stratify a given population. But a focus on these indices, and the corresponding development of precise criteria, is perhaps missing the point; there are enough resources in the language itself, be it English or Urdu, that remove any grounds for contention. Assuming that the author’s claim pertains to Pakistan, as a Pakistani reader who has never travelled outside of Pakistan, not even watched TV programmes, Pakistani or non-Pakistani, I can recognise and identify the affluent. More to the point, I can identify myself on this score; I am clear as to my own affluence or lack of it. Perhaps the very fact that I have access to Hashwani’s text, the fact that I can read it, already determines the class, or more neutrally, the set, to

14In the course of this lecture I shall quote this one-page text in its entirety. Since it is constituted by three paragraphs, I shall devote a subsection to the discussion of each paragraph, and a concluding subsection to a one-sentence summary, a possible abstract.
15In the sequel, I shall be rude, and rather than the full name, as I understand my culture to prefer, if not to demand, I shall follow academic conventions of the “West” and refer to him only as Hashwani.
16I shall follow the convention of italicizing all those terms that I regard as technical terms for my text; terms for which an effort at definition, not necessarily precise and quantifiable, but publicly communicable, ought to be attempted. And of course I shall fail at times to italicize what ought to be italicized by the criteria I have laid down.
The first dichotomy, on the other hand, requires more sophistication from the reader. It comes packaged in centuries of reflection that can perhaps be best characterised as political. Even if I force myself to remain focused on the word \textit{social}, to give up the insistence for a more precise understanding of the term \textit{order}, not to let my mind wander on the noun and remain with the adjective, and understand the \textit{social} by contrasting it with the \textit{political}, \textit{economic}, \textit{communal} or even a \textit{sensory},\footnote{I shall defer to future work a more detailed analysis, presumably literary and sociological, of the entire magazine. As regards the point at issue, no reader could mistake the readership for whom the section \textit{haute couture} is compiled, or indeed the very title of the magazine, \textit{Bonjour}, is chosen; for the select few in Pakistan who understand French.} and move on to the adverbs \textit{peaceful} and \textit{harmonious}, the pressing question concerns the criteria of \textit{peace} and \textit{harmony}. How am I to develop them? Here perhaps I have to lean more on the resources of the historical sciences than those of the social sciences.\footnote{See Hayek (1952), a neglected work whose epistemological significance for social sciences has yet to be brought out.} On the determination of whether a social order is \textit{peaceful} and \textit{harmonious}, I am really thinking of the difference between the normal and the pathological, between health and disease, between functionality and dysfunctionality.\footnote{Perhaps this is the place to offer an apology for whistling in the dark and adding the term \textit{science} to any subject whose autonomy is in question; in this perhaps, I also follow convention without any trace of originality.} The inquiry, of necessity, has to be comparative, comparisons that extend more over time than over space, even allowing that space perhaps comes already packaged in time. To see whether a concrete social order, say the Pakistani order here and now, is \textit{peaceful} and \textit{harmonious}, it would be beside the point, certainly Utopian and naively idealistic, if I compare it to an order that is \textit{alien}:\footnote{This word spills over with some relevance to regional cooperation on immigration policy and through it to notions of citizenship, important and relevant concerns that I shall be bracketing throughout this essay.} say, to Victorian Britain in the 1900’s or to the ante-bellum South of the United States or to a period in Islamic history that one considers particularly glorious. I really ought to form a judgement on the basis of “recent” Pakistani history, on those episodes in its history that I deem to be of more or less peace and harmony, that are not states of exception, of emergency, certainly not states of war, perhaps not even of tumult.\footnote{For an etymological analysis of this term, and related issues, see Agamben (2005), and his references to the work of the German philosopher Carl Schmitt.}

But here my own incompetence begins to nag. What is my judgement worth? What expertise do I have? Certainly, at the very least, what I previously left open needs to be closed. In my comparison with particular episodes of Pakistani history, I need boundaries to proceed. Do I sit these comparisons on the economic, or on the social, political or anthropological (ethnic), or on a combination of these? Do I come...
down to grounds or do I go up for a bird’s-eye view, a poet’s rather than a social scientist’s view? And what abilities do I have, beyond pretences, for forming such a view? In other words, what is the cash-value of my views? Even if I limit myself to the economic register, again insofar as this register can be isolated in this context (an isolation in which my own lack of understanding, by virtue perhaps of training that I deem excellent, attains its greatest salience), and judge the current situation, the state of the social order, as peaceful and harmonious, can I publicly communicate it to be so? Can I convince my public rather than simply silencing it? In short, in trying to understand a simple claim, I have landed myself into all sorts of aporias and confusions.

But the problem is clearly of my own making. I have got myself stymied by treating the simple as complex, by looking for a theorem, or an empirical regularity, when all that is being offered is a definition. If I try to give independent projections to the terms peaceful and harmonious and then to social and to order and finally, to affluence, and then attempt to understand the relation between them, recognising all along that the vitality of the relation rests on the vitality of the definitions of that which is being related, I will have to continue on for criteria, for indices of the significance (if statistical, all the better) of the relationship between indices. And there is really no end to this. And so, let me move on, from the consideration of the first sentence of Hashwani’s text to that of his second sentence, and ask myself what he means by the contrasting phrase “the other way around”?24 Since what is being talked about is a “gap as narrow as possible”, does a situation that is the “other way around” refer to a “gap as broad, as maximal, as possible”? Can this prescription be made operational, or is it in its use primarily rhetorical? Perhaps simply or merely rhetorical? However, Hashwani, almost in the same breath, moves from the static situation, one of extreme inequality (to now use the term extreme to give the imagined situation as much precision as the subject warrants), to dynamics; that is, to a situation of increasing inequality, one where the derivative of some measure of inequality with respect to time is positive. And this dynamic “portends a serious malaise”, and an “upheaval of grave magnitude”. I have to ask myself what this grave a representation of a grave situation precisely refers to. Even though the text refers to “social and economic upheaval”, there is nothing necessarily of the economic in it; it revolves around law and order, crime and a sense of belonging, its essence is not a static image but one of dynamic movement, a movement that draws its energy through the adverbial participles deteriorating, increasing and diminishing. But then it is perhaps the economic that leads to the social, the political and the communal, in so far as “belonging” can be understood as belonging to a society, to a polity or to a community. However, I

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23This is an important key-word for this essay; see Footnote (118) below.
24It might help the reader’s concentration to refresh herself by going back to Hashwani’s paragraph.
have already passed too quickly, and not asked what the author takes to be the sense of someone belonging to the nation: does one belong to the nation by unfailingly travelling on the national airline, and/or by standing to attention when the national anthem is sung, even perhaps cheering for its national cricket team—or does one belong only by laying one’s life on the line for the nation, not necessarily like those who do so for a purpose, to earn their livelihood, but for the sake of belonging, in and of itself. I leave all this unresolved, not completely understood, and move on yet again.

I see the pronoun we for the first time in my text:

What we see today at the national level and on the international horizon are the results of injustices, abuse of human rights, and the denial of the equitable access to the resources of the planet to its population.

Who speaks? To whom does he speak? Who are we? His “we” who see at a level, the national level, and also see on the horizon, an international horizon? Are the ones who are doing the seeing, the affluent or the non-affluent? the haves or the have-nots? those with a sense of belonging to the nation or those without this sense? We, who see injustice, abuse, denial of equity, see all this being perpetrated on the planet and to its population, see without any particularity and any provinciality, in its total universality. A judgement is being articulated in this text that in referring to us defines then we.

To understand any judgement of value we have to know something of the culture, perhaps the religion, within which it is made, as well as the particular circumstances that called it forth; what the man had done, what the question was when I spoke to him, and so on.

But in addition to a judgement, there is also a vision, a vision leading to a conception, to a presentation, perhaps to a representation, and thereby to theory and to theorising. And, as if on cue, my text of welcome brings theory into play:

So one can theorise that the current chaos that is being witnessed is the outcome of injustice and foul play, which may even lead to a runaway situation.

25It is of course no easy matter to determine whether in giving up one’s life, one is doing so as the accomplishment of a well-defined objective, a solution to a maximisation problem, or if one is going beyond purpose, beyond the problems, perhaps beyond rationality itself, rationality of all those who see as not submitting to maximisation problems as irrational in and of itself. For the importance of patriotism in the definition of a state, see Hegel (1821).

26It is of interest that in the quotation from Dr Haq furnished above, the mention of human rights is explicitly avoided. For a thought-provoking discussion of the possible meanings and history of this phrase, see Hamacher (2004, 2005).

27This particular/universal dichotomy will be important for me as I proceed down the road of this essay, and I shall be drawing oblique attention to it as the need arises.

28Rush Rhees describing conversation with Wittgenstein; see Rhees (1965, p. 21). For my reading of Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics, see Khan (2003). Also Footnote (37) above and the text it footnotes.
In this opening of theoretical possibility, the assignment of causality in the use of the word *outcome*, the text moves quite a bit away from being a simple welcome. The sentence is clearly of epistemological importance, for modelling, for curriculum development, for the way that the social sciences are to be partitioned and to be cut up. However, the point to note is the discontinuity in the text, a jettisoning of conditionality to the more certain, unconditional assertion; certainty to the “current chaos that is being witnessed”. Leaving aside the identity of the witness, the *shahid, injustice* is now seen to be coupled with *foul play* rather than with *abuse and denial of equity*. There is now concreteness of image, and as befits the not-altogether-absent pretension of theorising, the collective personal pronoun is laid aside: *we* do not theorise but *one* can theorise. This is the *one*, so beloved of positive economics, so dear to economics as practiced in a particular region, practiced with the handy tool of *rational self-interest* that flaunts its description of the world as it is and, through this description, presumably stumbles on to the knowledge of the world as it ought to be.  

I(b)

The question then is how ought it to be? the *it* perhaps standing for the economy, in so far it can stand at a distance from a society, or a polity or a community, to continue the chant of what is clearly well on its way to becoming a *mantra* for this essay. It is here in the second paragraph that Hashwani’s text begins to reveal its full savvy and sophistication, its measured and considered choice of words, its creation of mood and image, as befits an author who hails from a culture that is nothing if not textual, one attuned to the nuances of language and meaning. And if earlier, he had illustrated the rhetoric power of discontinuity within the same paragraph, he now illustrates the power of continuity between paragraphs, individuality merging with its other across the space of two separate paragraphs. At this point, the text uses the collective pronoun *we* the second of its three times:

So what should we do to arrest and improve it. That is a question which should agitate especially the minds of those who are sitting in position of authority and decision-making.  

In these metaphors of “arrest and improvement” of *it*, presumably, the chaos that is currently being witnessed, the text reaches back, if not to a sense of belonging to the nation, to deteriorating law and order and increasing crime, and in this

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29I have been emphasising curriculum development to the PSDE every since I served as a discussant for Larry Summers’ Quaid-i-Azam Lecture; see Khan (1992b); also Khan (1993b) and the more recent work of Andradi, *et al.* (2004).

30This is an important marker for this essay; see Footnotes (49, 95, 95) and the text they footnote.

31The distinction between *ought/is* is a hallowed one in economics in the guise of the *positive/normative*, and I shall be bracketing it in the sequel.

32I could not help recalling Carlos Diaz-Alejandro’s remark to Dr Haq when I first read these words.
connection, elevates policy-makers, and bureaucrats in position of authority, to police-officers whose job description revolves round “arrests”, not of people but of situations. And indeed they are asked, gently and implicitly, to learn from those they are to apprehend: they are to mentally absorb and imbibe their actions, transform agitations so destructive to the political and social order and put them to a constructive end, derive motivation and vigour from them. And these policy-makers, theoreticians rather than theorists, are viewed as sitting rather than standing, invoking the image of idly sitting by. Thus, this is no fundamentalist text, however one gives meaning to the terms, occidental or oriental, and uses them to evaluate it. In its nuanced and sophisticated use of imagery and rhetoric, in its confluence and dissociation of terms, of moods, it articulates, as a subtext, the attitude of a particular class to how it sees the world and how it wants to live its life.

And with this articulation, the text moves on to its raison d’etre—its very heart as embodied in its policy prescriptions:

Education should be for all and the basic thrust of education should be to enable the underprivileged to join the mainstream of population. Merit should be the criteria for further opportunities. Jobs should be created for the young of the country. New projects and developments should bring new opportunities for the young. Development of the backward areas, lacking in even basic amenities, should be undertaken. A whole-hearted regime for prompt dispensation of justice should be established.

In its drum-role of seven shoulds in five short sentences, a national plan is clearly being articulated, or at least defended. But disquieting questions arise. Why should education be for all if it means a sacrifice of the quality of education for my children? And why should merit, as opposed to (say) need or ethnic equity be the relevant criterion? Why jobs only for the young? why not for the old? Why development of the backward areas if it means a reduced allocation for my area? a reduction in the quality of amenities that my province enjoys? Did not someone say that it is not from the “benevolence of the butcher and the baker” that society benefits but from their looking after their own interests. Indeed this passage in my text brings to mind a famous question:

If we consider (6.422) an ethical law of the form “You ought ...” the first thought is “And what if I don’t?”

See Rothschild (2001) and her references for an interpretation of Smith’s stance to self-interest; also Khan (2004b) for how a modern economic scientist reads him. For an opposing viewpoint, see Hegel (1821).
But as I already mentioned obliquely above, my interest in this text lies in its philosophical sophistication, insofar as I can judge this on the basis of the philosophical ground on which I myself stand. The text pauses and reflects on what it is saying. It goes beyond its own local conditions and finds metaphors from outside its region, its language and its culture.

All these things are easier said than done and are Herculean task to accomplish. But long journeys commence with the first step and we should take that first step with total resolve and determination.

But after this self-reflexivity, the devaluation of its own statements—“easier said than done”—and its appeal to Greek mythology, it quickly returns to its own metaphors, to that of a long journey, and to that of a caravan. We are offered another should, but one that accents the adverbial, with how a step has to be taken, to be taken with “total resolve and determination”. And this is conclusively followed by a second we, only now to be additionally buffered by us:

If we fail to improve the lot of the underprivileged and the unfortunate, then calamity would beset all of us as individuals and as a nation.

Further classification, a classification now based on luck and fortune within the category of those who are not affluent, the have-nots, the underprivileged and the unfortunate. And therein lies another reason for the imperative should: the calamity, the runaway situation, the tumult, that would beset us, again individually and collectively.

I(c)

Now that I have attempted an explication of some of the questions which the subtleties of these two paragraphs raise, I go to the third and final paragraph of the text, the one that constitutes the first epigraph to this essay. It is a pledge of allegiance.

But now the text becomes mysterious and impenetrable, altogether more veiled. What is it precisely that one is giving allegiance to, and how is to be translated into actions? into the way I as a Pakistani ought to live, stand for, conduct myself? Why is the truth bitter? Is it bitter because it realises the costs associated with addressing itself to power? But then why does it not make one free, free of bitterness? How does one dedicate oneself both independently and collectively? be independent of, as well as part of, the collectivity at the same time? Is there a more sophisticated notion of temporality being developed here? And moving on to duty, what is it that gives it supremacy? How does it fare with other duties, to the ones one

38This question of the “Herculean task” will be an important marker for me in this essay, and I shall be returning to it.
39I have Muhammad Iqbal’s Bang-e-Dara (September, 1924) in mind.
40See Footnote (94) below referring to the work of Pocock in the context of the term fortuna.
holds dear, to the one who defines one, the duties to one’s God? And how am I to go about fulfilling this duty. How do I build a nation? Do I do it by taking part in “nation-building”, in so called, politicking? or by building myself and doing what I have been assigned by my talents and my luck to do as well as I can? Are there trade-offs here? And finally, “cohesion and the commitment”—the cohesion of what? the commitment to what? have we not seen certain causes to which we “ought” not to be committed, whose cohesiveness, if anything, ought to be rendered in-cohesive, de-cemented? de-minted?

But Hashwani and I belong to the same community and it is this, rather than a precise analysis of his words, that leads me to understand what he is trying to say, what his exhortation is designed to accomplish, and the supreme duty to the One that he has in mind. I have never met the man, but I think I know him by all that is behind his words of welcome. And having said this, and given his words more care and attention than, I presume, does his average guest; I move on to my next text after a summary sentence.

I(d)

In sum, Hashwani’s text is an address to the politically (and therefore economically) and economically (and therefore politically) powerful, an exhortation to move them from narrow self-interest to a more enlightened self-interest that takes the distribution of resources into account.

II

Unlike Hashwani’s welcome, Peter Singer’s One World: The Ethics of Globalization is, to me, an un-welcoming work, and at one level, this essay is simply an effort to understand my own puzzlement, if not fear and anxiety, at his vision of a single world. His appeal to a universal solvent of reason and of rationality, and his application of it to dissolve what he refers to as moral relativism,\(^{41}\) strips me of what I see to be my sense of self and my basic dignity. It is a picture of a world that is to be relentlessly homogenised and beaten into shape by the market, by utilitarianism, by the internationally powerful, and it is to be done in a style that demands my gratitude for all that is being done, remains to be done, to my beliefs, to my definitions, to me. But this is a summary view, an overview, perhaps an irrational fear of the other, an overreaction formed on the basis of a reading that is quick, has not allotted the time and the leisure that is required to give genuine consideration to the other. It is clear that I have to listen more carefully to the text’s voice, reflect on

\(^{41}\)Singer (2002, p. 140) flatly declares “We should reject moral relativism”. Perhaps his book can be read as one of mechanism design, as offering operational methods for doing this. Given my difficulties with the word ethics, I find it more useful to think of Singer’s book under the title One World: A Utilitarian Prescription for Dissolving Moral Relativism and Other Religious Ills.
In his “Preface”, Singer comments on the title of his book:

So the original title has remained, standing both as a description of the increasing interconnectedness of life on this planet, and as a prescription of what a basic unit for our ethical thinking should be (ix). As I began to plan the lectures, however, I saw that the underlying issue—the extent to which we should take all humans, or even all sentient beings, as the basic unit of concern for our ethical thinking—has important implications for a much wider set of issues than foreign aid. I therefore devoted each of the four Terry lectures: climate change, the World Trade Organisation and the globalisation of trade, national sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, and the original topic of what the rich ought to do for the poor (x).

So the concern of this text is the same as that of the last one, a concern with the division between the rich and the poor, the affluent and the non-affluent, the haves and the have-nots. But whereas Hashwani’s canvas is just a page, a miniature so to speak, Singer has more than two hundred and thirty five pages to work in, a mural to paint using ethics to supply all of its pigmentation and colouring. One text scrupulously avoids the very word and its derivatives, the other seems to live by it. Indeed, one can get a nodding acquaintance of the book just by tracking this word through its entire length.

There is no index entry for ethics or its derivatives, except for ethical standards, and yet it is omnipresent. Singer thinks differently about our ethics (19), adjusts his ethics to take account of new situations (20), mentions the ethical issue in discounting the future (25), contrasts ethical to economic justifications (26), sees major ethical flaws in an argument (39), distinguishes scientific from ethical objections (48), sees no ethical basis for the present distribution of the atmosphere’s capacity (49), talks of imposing a more ethically defensible solution, of unethical methods of fishing (66), takes alternative views with strong ethical credentials (98), works with an ethic that looks to our actions, a consequentialist ethic (132), distinguishes between legal and ethical justifications (137), rehearses ethical arguments against cultural imperialism (139), accepts a scope for rational argument in ethics (140), delineates the commonality of ethical systems everywhere (141), observes what a global ethics should or should not do (148), lists crucial steps for becoming a global ethical community (149), finds himself advocating an impartial ethic (158), sees and is seen by ethicists (165), charts the ethical significance of the nation-state (167), issues an ethical challenge (185). This text thinks and breathes ethics, relates to ethics and the ethical, sensually, so to speak, markets it, seems to make a business and a livelihood out of it. In the opening chapter, within the space of a single paragraph, the word is

42 For another review, one that places Singer’s text in the context of two others, see Joshi-Skidelsky (2004). Also, see Monk (2005) for a similar emphasis on working with an author’s “actual words”.

43 The entry on ethical standards has three sub-entries: intervention and (138-139), legitimacy and (96-105, 143-44), universal acceptance of (141-143, 165).

44 For my implicit stance to business and commerce, see Footnotes (5, 82) and the text they footnote. Also Footnotes (47) below to the work of Hirschman and Pocock.
used nine times, cannot be let loose even in the sole sentence of a concluding footnote. Even though the text seems to swear by it, the question of course is what the text means by it? how it goes beyond its use as a swear-word? what is it precisely that it breathes? whether it ennobles it or degrades it?

And all this ethical material is gathered around four chapters of substance—on atmosphere, on economy, on law, on community—book-ended by chapters titled *A changing world* and *A better world*? But there are two additional prefatory points that I should like to raise before reading my text through these four registers, two counts on which this text attains for me its particular distinction relative to the previous one. The first of these is its attitude to the United States. It is the fourth paragraph (of eight) of the last chapter that best encapsulates this attitude, best displays in “cool but plain language (198),” its particular badge of courage:

> When the world’s most powerful state wraps itself in what—until September 11, 2001—it took to be the security of its military might, and arrogantly refuses to give up any of its own rights and privileges for the sake of the common good—even when other nations are giving up their rights and privileges—the prospects for finding solutions to global problems are dimmed. One can only hope that when the rest of the world nevertheless proceeds down the right path, as it did in resolving to go ahead with the Kyoto Protocol, and as it is now doing with the International Criminal Court, the United States will eventually be shamed into joining it. If it does not, it risks falling into a situation in which it is universally seen by everyone except its own self-satisfied citizens as the world’s “rogue superpower” (198).

But whereas this is the finale, the animus runs through the entire text:

> [That] fact ... makes the position of the United States particularly odious from an ethical perspective (44). Now the other industrialised nations have agreed to turn off the tap (to be strictly accurate, to restrict the flow), leaving the United States, the biggest culprit, alone in its refusal to commit itself to reducing emissions (45).

But why do I term it *animus*? Are these not facts? Does not the United States “do” to the world what economics “does” to the social sciences? Determine who, or what, is to be included or excluded? My point is rather the style of discourse, a language neither cool nor plain, one in which

> ... genuine open-minded exploration of the crucial and difficult issues arising from globalisation is losing out to partisan polemics, long in rhetoric and thin in substance, with each side speaking only to its own supporters who already know who the saints and sinners are (54-55).46

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45See page 12 in Singer (2002). The footnote is Footnote 18 and it refers the reader to the author himself and to one other that he approves of; see Singer (2002, p. 12). In this entire section II, numbers next to text will indicate quotations from this book.

46To get an idea of what the text’s other is in this context, see Jameson (1991, 1998); Robertson (2000) and their references. For example, Jameson (1991) writes “Everyone is now willing to mumble, as though it were an inconsequential concession in passing to public opinion and current received wisdom (or shared communicational presuppositions), that no society can function efficiently without the market, and that planning is obviously impossible”. Elsewhere in the essay, he notes that the “fundamental level on which political struggle is waged is that of the legitimacy of concepts like planning or the market ...
But how “short in rhetoric and thick in substance” is the grammar of the words and phrases wraps itself, arrogantly refuses, dimmed prospects, shamed, odious, biggest culprit, rogue superpower. In this sense, Hashwani’s is a much more measured text. His view of the Pakistani other is expressed with decorum, on an abstract plane, without abuse, in cooler language. He talks only of the “international horizon”, and as befits a text by a businessman looking away from his business, or rather focussing on the infra-structural underpinnings of his business, hunts towards compromise, towards the mutually agreeable, the commonality, takes the price system as given.47

My two texts also differ in their motivational thrust, their exhortational impulse. Hashwani talks of the “supreme duty” to Pakistanis, and if any Pakistani were to ask him the groundings of such a duty, I believe that I as a Pakistani know what sources, resource if one prefers, he would invoke. Hashwani and I belong to the same community, we have family resemblances among us, our language game is the same.48 It would certainly not be the authority of gharz or hawas—one’s self-interest, a final outcome resulting from a cost-benefit calculation.49 The notion of self-interest, however, is the fuel that drives the engine of Singer’s text. In his very first chapter, he writes:

Shortly before the September 11 attacks, a United Nations panel issued a report pointing out that even if there were no altruistic concern among the rich nations to help the world’s poor, their own self-interest should lead them to do so (7).

And then in the very last chapter:

Even from a strictly self-interested perspective, if the United States wants the cooperation of other nations in matters that are largely its own concern—such as the struggle to eliminate terrorism, it cannot be so regarded [as a rogue superpower] (199).

The rhetoric of the logic is fascinating in that the United States is not being primarily addressed on the morality or justice of its actions, but on the grounds of its self-interest; put better, also on the grounds of its self-interest as the text understands them to be. However, the problem with untramelled self-interest is that there is a point at which it has to be relinquished and harnessed. That the text would sooner or later meet this obstacle is inevitable.50

How to prevent global bodies from becoming either dangerous tyrannies or self-aggrandising bureaucracies, and instead make them effective and responsive to the people whose lives they affect, is something that we still need to learn. It is a challenge that should not be beyond the best minds in the fields of political science and public administration, once they adjust to the new reality of the global community (199).51

47 For an elaboration of the Smithian argument that commerce softens manners, ensures politeness, teaches the way with words, see Hirschman (1997) and Pocock (1975, 1985); also Khan (1990). Footnote (94) below is also relevant here.
48 For a reading of Wittgenstein’s lecture on ethics, see Khan (2003). More generally, see Monk (2005).
49 On the importance of self-interest in Adam Smith, see Rothschild (2001). Also see the references in Footnote (95) below.
51 See Hashwani’s challenge in the exhortation to attempt the Herculean task in Footnote (38) above.
All these words lead the mind to wonder, even as it starts out, who precisely does their author think he is? who is he writing for? who is he prescribing to? who is his our? For whom is his should? What is the interest and passion of this text, and given my own interest and passion, how is it that I cannot understand the language game that is being played? At this point, other than the phrase the right path (in the second quotation of this subsection), I am quite at sea with the author’s words.52

However, with these three attitudes out on the table—to ethics, to the United States, to self-interest—let me turn to a more detailed reading of the four registers, four words—atmosphere, economy, law and community—the author uses to cut open and restitch the world.

II(a)

I begin with the chapter on the atmosphere:

So, to put it in terms a child could understand, as far as the atmosphere is concerned, the developed nations broke it (33).

So, this is the first distributional assertion, a measured fixing of blame. And at this point, the text lifts or lowers (I am not quite sure which) its sights from the United States, from the West and the ‘free World’, to all of the developed nations, a move in keeping with Hashwani’s gentle hint to look at the “international horizon”. But what is it that the developed nations broke?

Here Singer can best be understood through the language of commodification. Think of the atmosphere as one macroeconomic commodity, an amalgam of clean air, gases, pollutants of all kinds, that can be aggregated like the money supply, or labour, or an investment good, or a consumption good, aggregation of the kind as is assumed in economic science, and that results in a homogeneous commodity whose qualities and characteristics are precisely delineated, perhaps precise enough for it to be measured and represented as a point in a finite-dimensional (infinite-dimensional?) Euclidean space. The question, then, is the optimal amount of this commodity that is to be produced for the world, now, if not forever, and the issue is that this optimal amount is not being produced, that there are culprits, saints and sinners, to use the text’s language, who are to blame, on whom the responsibility for this non-optimality is to be fixed. However, the text offers a solution to the environmental problem:53

52I translate the phrase the right path by the Qur’anic sirat-ul-mustaqeem, from Surah Al-Fatihah, Chapter 1, a phrase that all those who are observing Muslims are obligated to recite, by convention, several times in their daily prayers.

53For details as to the constructions underlying this paragraph, see Debreu (1959); McKenzie (2002); Khan (1990) was an early expository presentation to the PSDE regarding what I then termed the ADMMA construction and contrasted it with the CNH constructions.
That mechanism is emissions trading (46).

It is the solution of what in some circles masquerades as the only legitimate form of economic theory, a market solution, a neo-liberal prescription. Property rights are to be delineated, and these allocations, *iou’s or debt instruments* to take metaphors from finance, can be traded on the open market:

Thus the market would provide a measure of the additional burden put on the world’s atmosphere by keeping one’s house at a pleasant temperature when it is too cold, or too hot, outside (47).

But the text has already dipped enough, dabbled enough into the vocabulary of *ethics* to know that *ethics* does not come neatly packaged, with the economic solution neatly bounded away from the political, facts distinct from values, science from religion, especially if both science and religion are broadly and compassionately understood. What if a particular regime does not use its allocation of the environmental commodity for the purposes that it has been given it? a family does not use the food stamps to buy food to feed the dependent infant, but rather sells it on the open market to buy weapons and alcohol? My text has an answer:

It is to refuse to recognise a corrupt dictatorial regime, interested only in self-preservation and self-enrichment, as the legitimate government of the country that has excess quota to sell. An international authority answerable to the United Nations could hold the money it receives in trust until the country has a government able to make a credible claim that the money will be used to benefit the people as a whole (48-49).

But now we land at the same point in this text as we did in the other one, the point at which it had to rely on the drum-role of *shoulds*. How are we, whoever we may be, to keep a regime away from self-preservation and self-enrichment in a situation whose very design uses these as the engine of what it has set out to accomplish? How are we going to prevent the corrupt dictatorial regimes from corrupting the system? To fix prices instead of passively taking them in as the standards to be followed? How are we going to keep the United Nations credible and trustworthy? the angels who are going to keep its integrity intact? to police it? But whereas Hashwani is philosophically sophisticated and conscious of the problem, appeals to a higher cause, to a *supreme duty*, something transcendent, Singer has no doubts about human fallibility and human ignorance, about dispersed and incomplete information, \(^{54}\) and has therefore little need for any such supplementation. The text lays out the utilitarian argument: \(^{55}\)

The egalitarian principle will not, in general, be what utilitarians with perfect knowledge of all the consequences of their actions would choose. Where there is no other clear criterion for allocating shares, however, it can be an ideal compromise that leads to a peaceful solution, rather than to continued fighting. Arguably, that is the best basis for defending “one person, one vote” as a rule

\(^{54}\)For an explication of the importance of these ideas, see Hayek (1944, 1948); also Khan (2005).

\(^{55}\)The text does consider Rawls, but some of the voices that I would have liked to see considered, in the way that I am considering Singer’s text, by quotation and by letting him speak, are those, for example, of Fidler (2000), Hindess (2004a, 2004b), Pagden (1998) and their references.
of democracy against claims that those who have more education, or who pay more taxes, or who have served in the military, or who believe in the one true God, or who are worse or should have additional votes because of their particular attributes (41-42).

Let me ignore the gratuitous injection about the “one true God”: philosophers, hotel managers, porters, the writer of these lines, all have their unconscious, their fears of the night, and they ought not to be given undue importance. The interesting question concerns the ideal compromise, the best basis: what are these? how are they to be attained? Is this just a private language? And these “utilitarians with perfect knowledge of all the consequences of their actions”—who are these unicorns? these mythical creatures come from whose past? And when all else fails, the text utters the magic words principle of diminishing marginal utility. But are there not issues relating to cardinal utility, to the impossibility of an interpersonal comparison of tastes, to the pervasiveness of non-convexities? At what level is one to read this text? At what point does it relinquish an open-minded exploration of the crucial and difficult issues and turn instead to therapeutic chanting, healing through voodoo, therapy through babble?

Clearly, I need to read further.

II(b)

I continue with the chapter on the economy, and with its sober statement about economic science, about what it claims and does not claim:

Economics raises questions of value, and economists tend to be too focussed on markets to give sufficient importance to values that are not dealt with well by the market (55).

But perhaps this is not phrased in the most felicitous way. The point is that a certain type of economic theory, one of its more mainstream and prominent brands, explicitly advocates the dissociation between questions of the distribution and the efficiency of resources, and focuses entirely on the latter, on situations where everyone gains, and there is no entanglement with conditions under which a policy benefits one and harms the other. This is the impulse that leads some economists to avoid the discussion of values that are not marketable, an impulse that has led to the

57See the relevant entries in Eatwell, et al. (1987). Khan (1989) was an early expository presentation to the PSDE on these issues.
58On utilitarianism, see Williams (1972) and Smart-Williams (1973). Also Ferguson (2004), a work with obvious and rather profound implications for economic science, something I hope to bring out in future work.
59This is of course a rather complicated issue—the extent to which exchange and reciprocity is imbricated in our very language, and therefore economics imbricated in our way of life. I bracket these issues here, and refer the reader to Cavell (2003, Chapter 6) and Khan (2003a).
60On the fluidity of typology, see Cameron’s (2005) reading of Melville’s Billy Budd; also Footnote (105) below.
enviable autonomy of their subject matter, prevented what can be seen in some circles as inter-disciplinary promiscuity. 62 In some sense, Singer’s text is aware of this impulse, of its essential thrust:

According to standard economic models, if various assumptions hold—including the assumptions that people always act fully rationally and on the basis of perfect information—free trade within a single, well-governed nation can be expected to create a state of affairs that is “Pareto efficient”—in other words, a state of affairs where no one’s welfare can be improved without reducing the welfare of at least one person. This is because the government will have legislated so that the private costs of production are brought into line with their costs to society overall (92). Thus, judged strictly in economic terms, without global environmental protection there is no reason to expect free trade to be Pareto efficient, let alone to maximise overall welfare (93).

And now the secret is out, the veil removed. Singer’s text is as much a text of applied welfare economics as it is a text on ethics. It is this that lies behind his solution for the environment. Using the fundamental theorems of welfare economics as its key, the text begins an elaborate defence of the WTO, 63 technical defence based on economic jargon, on the “internalisation of externalities”, 64 but one in which the theorems remain veiled, in purdah so to speak, in the sense that their conclusions are appealed to, but their assumptions are never explicitly brought into play. 65

Is there an odour of something being sold here? or self-deceptive imaginings on my part, a simple expression of my own desires? I read further to get my bearings.

II (c)

I move to the chapter on the law, one that cautions against self-deception, self deception of nations rather than that of individuals, 66 and thus relies on the individual/collective dichotomy that my earlier text had already put into play:

We need to have rules and procedures 67 making intervention difficult to justify, for as I have already noted, some nations are capable of deceiving themselves into believing that their desire to expand their influence in the world is really an altruistic concern to defend democracy and human rights (138). 68

62See Buchanan’s powerful 1959 essay on one view of economics; also Buchanan (2001) for a general view on economics.
63See page 55 for a discussion of four charges, and their rebuttal; also Singer’s treatment of the Vandana Shiva’s view, pages 78-79. By this point, the author had already characterised the opponents of the international organisations.
64This is a technical term of economic science; see Debreu (1959); McKenzie (2002) and the relevant entries in Eatwell, et al. (1987). Also the expositions in Khan (1989, 1990, 1993b)—all presentations to the PSDE.
65The Oakeshottian dichotomy of theorist/theoretician is relevant in this manoeuvre; see Footnote (34) above and Footnote (109) below and the text they footnote for the importance of this Oakeshottian distinction for me.
66For orientation regarding this marker of self-interest, see Footnotes (49, 95) and the text they footnote.
67See Hayek (1944, 1948) and subsequent work in this connection.
68For another point of view on rights, see Hamacher (2004, 2005).
But this text is nothing if not sophisticatedly circular; that is to say that its subject matter leads it to proceed through flaunting the circularities in it, to return to sabotage itself and its own point of view. The warning against self-deception is not extended to pre-emptive strikes; indeed, the text seems to advocate them on occasion, does not caution at all, individuals and nations alike, about taking the law in their own hands; or to phrase the matter in a better way, includes the warning and the disregarding of the warning in the same chapter, at the same time:

If punishment can be justified, so can intervention to stop a crime that is about to occur, or already in progress (120).

So much for giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt and the protection of the law, the rule of law.

But my interest in this chapter centres not so much on national self-deception, as on the basic ethical principles that it lays down, on how it redeems the cash-value of the veritable shower of the ethical words that I catalogued above:

It would, of course, be easier to agree to common ethical principles if we could first agree on questions that are not ethical but factual, such as whether there is a god, or gods, and if there is, or are, whether he, she, or they have or has expressed his, her or their will or wills in any of the various texts claimed by adherents of different religions to be divinely inspired. Unfortunately, on these matters we seems to be even further from agreement than we are on basic ethical principles (142).

I was taught that “if a lion could speak, we would not be able to understand him”. I certainly cannot understand this text. Written by a distinguished ethicist, a person whose business it is to profess ethics, surely will not stoop to a mocking of beliefs, to provocation by ridicule.69 Why is it then that I cannot make head nor tail of this paragraph? I need self-understanding, to move on and read more:

[T]he ultimate question of the relationship between democracy and sovereignty has not been solved. What if the monarchy, though expressing confidence that its people support it, does not wish to hold a referendum on its own existence. How can we give reasons independent of our own culture, for the view that legitimacy requires popular support, rather than, say, resting on religious law? Attempts to argue for the separation of church and state will not work, since that begs the question against the defenders of the religion that rejects such a separation (144).

One has clearly to pause here and reflect on what the “ultimate solution” to the “ultimate question” involves,70 how a text would fashion an answer, perhaps after refashioning the question to make it more precise? It inevitably becomes teleological

69I have the lack of sensitivity in the first sentence particularly in mind—the simultaneous pain and amusement that it could give to a man of cloth, a woman of faith.

70See Footnote (13) on the phrase “last analysis” in the quotation from the sentence of Dr Mahbub-ul-Haq. My training in the West has justifiably made me fearful of “ultimate solutions” and I use this phrase circumspectly, with all the flaggings of that history.
at this point, and begins to speak of “endings,” speaks of them twice within the same paragraph:

In the end,\(^{11}\) the challenge\(^{12}\) cannot be met without confronting the basis for belief in the religion. But one cannot argue that the religious faith of people of a different culture is false, while upholding a religious faith of one’s own that rests on no firmer ground. That really would be cultural imperialism.\(^{13}\) In the end, at least as far as we are concerned with practices based on propositions about the existence of a god or gods and the authenticity of divinely inspired scriptures, it is our capacity to reason that is the universal solvent. But that is not a question into which we can go further here (144).

What precisely does this text want to dissolve with its magic solution? And what does it understand to be my God? And why does he not capitalise God since it knows how to do it.\(^{14}\) And having raised the issue, why does it not want to go further? Where does it contemplate going in any case? Is its purpose to foster communication, to understand the heart that beats in the other’s breast? or is it to rattle its sabre, indulge itself in exercises that confront, as it itself puts it, others’ beliefs? The answer follows:

We should reject moral relativism (140). Once we accept that there is scope for rational argumentation in ethics, independent of any particular culture, we can also ask whether the values we are upholding are sound, defensible and justifiable (140).\(^{15}\) Some aspects of ethics can be claimed to be universal, or very nearly so.

The inevitable particular/universal dichotomy is firmly at play:\(^{16}\)

Reciprocity, at least, seems to be common to ethical systems everywhere. The notion of reciprocity may have served as the basis for the “Golden Rule”—treat others as you would like them to treat you—which elevates the idea of reciprocity into a distinct principle not necessarily related to how someone actually has treated you in the past (141)

But what is the science behind the statement that ensures the irrelevance of “how someone actually has treated [me] in the past” to the present, and especially when I simultaneously hold to the maximisation of self-interest. Who says that I cannot be influenced by Levinas (1969, 1996) and treat others better than I know (for a fact, in the manner of the all-knowing Singerian utilitarian) how he or she will treat me? On what basis does it speak? What are its grounds? its religion? its science, in so far as it is different from its religion? What does it understand by religion and religious ethics in any case. The text answers by marshalling names as examples:

\(^{11}\)See Footnotes (13, 70) above on Haq’s phrase “last analysis”.
\(^{12}\)See Footnotes (38, 51) and the text they footnote on the “Herculean challenge”.
\(^{13}\)This question of what “really” is cultural imperialism would require more self-reflexivity than I can currently summon; also see Footnote (91) below.
\(^{14}\)Except for Hashwani, both Badiou and Singer seem to have a complicated relationship to religion. In any case, God, capitalised and un-capitalised, is an important marker for this essay. For an instance where Singer capitalises the term, see the quote after Footnote (55) above.
\(^{15}\)For a move towards one possible criterion of “philosophical soundness,” see the text footnoted by Footnote (102) below.
\(^{16}\)See Footnote (27) above and the text it footnotes.
The Golden Rule can be found, in differing formulations, in a wide variety of cultures and religious teachings, including, in roughly chronological order, those of Zoroaster, Confucius, Mahavira (the founder of Jainism), the Buddha, The Hindu epic Mahabharata, the Book of Leviticus, Hillel, Jesus, Mohammed, Kant, and many others (141).

But by now I am thoroughly beaten, if not by this text, then by its (this) chapter. It will not allow me to give it a considered appreciation. It cobbles together these sources, in what it calls, rough “chronological order”, but does not mention the Qurān, does not show any awareness that Mohammed, may he rest in peace, at least according to a non-negligible set of people on (what the text refers to as) “this planet,” is not the author of the Qurān, and that his teachings, as embodied in the Sunnah, also have authorial references. Instead, there is a reference to one Leonard Swidler’s edited volume For all Life: Toward a Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic, pages nineteen to twenty-one. I can only resolve, in the future, as time permits, to look at these three pages; meanwhile, I move to the final chapter of this book on the ethics of globalisation.

II(d)

Meanwhile, heavy-hearted but also with a sense of relief, I come to the last chapter, that on the community:

Let us return to the issue of partiality for family, lovers and friends. We have seen that there are impartial reasons for accepting some degree of partiality here. But how much? In broad terms, as much as is necessary to promote the goods mentioned above, but no more. Thus the partiality of the parents for their children must extend to providing them the necessities of life, and also their more important wants, and must allow them to feel loved and protected; but there is no requirement to satisfy every desire a child expresses, and many reasons why we should not do so (164).

The solvent remains the same, but its constituents, reason and rationality, now find their most obvious expression in commodification. And this presupposes an objective view, impartial reasons for partiality, and the attendant quantification: by “how much”? Presumably, so much, and “no more”! And how does one measure the extent to which someone feels loved, the allowance someone determines necessary for feeling loved? For feeling protected? And as to the requirements that “satisfy every desire,” my imagination is not equal to the task of imagining such a requirement, the language that it would be expressed in? And given my failure of imagination, or this loss of nerve, how am I to take seriously, or operationally implement, its prescriptions on how I, as an American parent, should raise my

77The issue has to do with where and how the Qurān places reciprocity rather than being aggrieved at its omission in this roll-call.
78It is a good exercise for a reading on ethics to mark this word; see Footnotes (99, 101, 104) below.
79In terms of the ADMMMAA construction of Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie, what is being presupposed is a fully delineated commodity space.
children. It is stated therein:

With lovers and friends, something similar applies: the relationships require partiality, but they are stronger where there are shared values, or at least respect for the values that each holds. Where the values shared include concern for the others, irrespective of whether they are friends or strangers, then the partiality demanded by friendship or love will not be so great as to interfere in a serious way with the capacity for helping those in great need (164-165).

But by now my disorientation is complete. This is a lion roaring, and rather than insight, I get only intimidation. I no longer understand the words, do not understand the similarity, the distinction between a friend and a lover, do not understand how a text whose ostensible aim is to foster global understanding and communication, hopes to talk about “family, lovers and friends” to cultures ill-at-ease with such categories. I am clearly derailed, and the reason for this derailment is also clearly mine. I have got too close to this text, focussed so closely on it that I can no longer see it for what it is, taken it far too seriously before working hard enough on the pre-requisites needed for me to appreciate its marginal scientific contribution. I ought to move back to get a better view, to be able to distinguish between its rhetoric and its science, its subtle use of its extravagances and its fundamentalisms to further the cause of its reason. I should perhaps ignore it, lay it aside for the time being, read more about its author, get to know him not in the abstract, but perhaps more concretely, in the flesh, so to speak, perhaps even read about his grandfather and his upbringing, give up the aspiration, for the moment, to learn at his feet, and perhaps say like Bartleby that “I prefer not to”, that I take myself out of its circulations. I have reached a point at which, after my one-sentence summary, I need to move on, across the ocean, to another continent.

II(e)

In sum, Singer’s text is an address to the politically (and therefore economically) and economically (and therefore politically) powerful nations, an exhortation to move them from narrow self-interest to a more enlightened self-interest that takes the distribution of international resources into account.

III

My third text belongs to a genre all its own; rather than a welcome, or a
course of lectures sponsored by a Foundation, Badiou’s text was read at the University of Sydney in 1999. It is “academic”, much more linear and much less exhortatory than the other two; where the first is addressed to hotel guests, and the second to a philosopher’s fellow citizens, this addresses itself to “philosophy”—to its four-dimensional desire, its present state, its orientations, its flaws, its questioning by the world—and through his address to it, works towards a new style and a new doctrine of and for it.

In this section, I first take up the address, and then the advocacy.

III(a)

Philosophy’s desire, the desire for philosophy, is addressed in four registers, a four-fold desire: revolt, logic, universality and risk. How am I to translate these words, Badiou’s words, so that I can understand to some extent, if not precisely, what it is that he is saying. He helps. About revolt, he writes “the discontent of thinking in its confrontation with the world as it is (40)”, and I have already seen this discontent in the two texts I have heretofore discussed. Hashwani’s discontent with the current chaos and Singer’s discontent, many winters of discontent, in the handling of atmosphere, economy, law and community, with the United States. But rather than the United States alone, Badiou focuses on the West,

... this world, our world, the ‘Western’ world (with as many inverted commas as you want) (40),

and offers the claim that thought in it, from it, presumably like Singer’s thought, cannot revolt in his sense of revolt,

this world already decrees itself ‘free’, it presents itself as ‘the free world’—this is the very name it gives itself, an ‘isle’ of liberty on a planet otherwise reduced to slavery and devastation (40)

a planet whose condition Hashwani characterises in terms of “injustices, abuse of human rights, and denial of the equitable access to [its] resources to its population”. Thus, in this thrust, all my three texts are on the same page.

But this text gives another reason regarding which the first is not explicit and the second is surely opposed:

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83Peter Singer’s book originates as The Dwight Harrington Terry Foundation Lectures on Religion in the Light of Science and Philosophy.
84Fortunately, it is not an easy matter to regulate with any precision the readership for which a text is written.
85These words all go towards section headings of Badiou’s lecture.
86In this entire section III, numbers next to text will indicate page numbers to quotations from Badiou (2003a).
87This may be a totally unwarranted attribution on my part. In any case, the question remains as to how Badiou looks on the origins of his thoughts. Does he think of himself, for example, as a “man of the East”?
88With reference to Footnote (87) above, perhaps my attribution is not totally unwarranted.
... this world, our world, standardises and commercialises the stakes of such freedom. It submits them to monetary uniformity, and with such success that our world has no longer to revolt to be free since it guarantees us freedom. However it does not guarantee us the free use of this freedom, since such use is in reality already coded, oriented and channelled by the infinite glitter of merchandise.

Indeed, as I have seen for myself, the entire thrust of Singer’s exhortation is based on furthering commodification of this sort, of furthering submission to international agencies, albeit somehow better-designed and better-regulated. In my own language, hear Badiou’s call as a call for jang, justuju, jihad, the first as in the name of the Pakistani newspaper, the other two as in a struggle, striving, seeking, struggling above all with one’s self, making war on one’s “vices and weaknesses”, on the temptations that self-interest lays out in front of one’s self. I shall bracket how these words are to be further projected in an enterprise of regional cooperation, the identification of the subspaces in the different languages that are involved in such inter-cultural communication.

When I turn to the register of logic, this gap between Badiou and Singer, if anything, widens. Badiou does not use this term to make grand claims about rationality and reason, on “open-minded exploration of the crucial and difficult issues”, but focuses instead on the “illogical regime of communication”:

> [M]ass communication presents the world to us as a spectacle devoid of memory, a spectacle in which new images and new remarks cover, erase and consign to oblivion the very images and remarks that have just been shown and said.

It is this mass communication that determines meaning, decides what is rational and open-minded, with the way things ought to be thought, how economics is to earn its autonomy from sociology, politics, anthropology; how religion is to be submitted to an economics of religion. More specifically, it is the marketability of economics, as given circulation by the media, that decides what economics is, how it ought to be done, what it should look for, what it ought to model and the way it is to model it, what to include and exclude. And in all this, it determines who am I.

But if Badiou and Singer differ on how they see the reach of economics, and in this difference, allow me to understand each of them better, and Hashwani tactfully avoids these waters, all my three texts are at one on the question of universality, on the identification of that which applies to what they refer to as the “world,” and “humanity,” on all that which is most uniquely mine and therefore everyone’s. On this ability to communicate the very basic and fundamental issues to

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90See Khan (2005) for submission as an important marker in the work of Hayek (1944, 1948). Also the author’s three lectures on Hayek delivered at George Mason University, May 2005.
91On the role of international agencies, see Hindess (2004a, 2004b); Fidler (2000) and their references.
92Singer devotes words to cultural imperialism and to inter-cultural communication but without emphasising in any way issues of language; see Singer (2001, pp. 79, 130–144). Also the text to Footnote (73) above.
the world,\textsuperscript{92} to all the people on this planet, to the entire world, to humanity at large, my three texts go seamlessly into each other. However, Badiou does issue a cautionary warning based on specialisation consequent to the division of labour\textsuperscript{93} as to what precisely it is that one can communicate:

And the requirements of this specialisation and this fragmentation make it difficult to perceive what might be transversal or universal; that is what might be valid for all thinking (41).

Finally, I turn to risk, \textit{fortuna} in the language of civic humanism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{94} It is interesting that in their exhortations, neither of my two earlier texts raise this issue when they address themselves to national and international planners, the issue of unintended consequences, of the trade-offs between spontaneity and design, of the perils of self-interest and of self-deception. Badiou is openly contemptuous of such planning, presumably of organising the world though efficiency and Pareto optimality. Indeed, the disease is that of reciprocity, of a cost-benefit calculus:

Existence requires more and more elaborate calculation. Life is devoted to calculating security and this obsession with calculating security is contrary to the Mallarméan hypothesis that thought begets a throw of the dice, because in such a world there is infinitely too much risk in a throw of the dice (41).

It is now no longer clear to me which of my two texts is better-suited for use as a welcome to powerful guests rather than as a text for undergraduate classes in business ethics.

I read Badiou responding to the offer of a universal solvent by a listing of three (only three?) orientations of philosophy, each with their prophets: the hermeneutic associated with Heidegger and Gadamer, a German site, the site of romanticism; the analytic associated with Carnap and Wittgenstein, the Vienna circle that dominates academic philosophy in England and the United States; and the post-modern associated with Derrida and Lyotard, “most active in France, [but] equally very active in Spain, Italy and Latin America”. The first is associated with interpretation, the second with “rules that govern meaning”, and the third with the “deconstruction of the accepted facts of modernity”. It is the third that will dissolve the universal solvent, neutralise its foul potency:

\textsuperscript{92}This question of the “basic and fundamental” is shaping to be the “most basic and fundamental” marker of this essay. But leaving aside the puncturing of pompousity, mine and others, let me refer the reader to the Footnotes (13, 70, 71, 96) that track its importance.

\textsuperscript{93}See the relevant entries on Smith in Eatwell, \textit{et al.} (1987) for the importance of the idea \textit{division of labour} in economic science; also see Rothschild (2001).

\textsuperscript{94}For the language of civic humanism and its contrast to that of classical republicanism at what may be regarded as the founding moment of economic science, see Pocock (1975, 1985); Khan (2000b) draws the relevance of this work to issues of ‘globalisation’.

\textsuperscript{95}For the author’s attempts to understand the difficulties of the trade-offs between spontaneity and design, as for example in the work of Hayek, see Khan (2005). On the differences of four distinguished modern economists, Marshall, Keynes, Joan Robinson and Hahn, all Professors at Cambridge University, see Khan (2004b). For Marshall’s approach to the other, also Khan (2004a).
The fundamental opposition here is what can be regulated and what cannot be regulated, or what conforms to a recognised law assuring an agreement about meaning, and what eludes all explicit laws, thus falling into illusion or discordance (43). Postmodern philosophy proposes to dissolve the great constructions of the nineteenth century to which we remain captive—the idea of the historical subject, the idea of progress, the idea of humanity and the ideal of science (44).

These different orientations have commonalities, a “destiny that is joined”. On the negative side, they all announce and close, “maintain that philosophy is itself situated within the end of philosophy (45)”; and on the positive side, they privilege, all three of them, language. Badiou writes:

The first axiom ... is negative. Philosophy can no longer pretend to be what it had for a long time decided to be, that is, a search for truth. The second axiom is that language is the crucial site of thought because that is where the question of meaning is at stake (47).

The ‘world’ according to Badiou, then, is asking four things of philosophy: calling it to take over from the social sciences; to recognise that great enterprises and the metanarratives, universal solvents, if one prefers, like *reason, progress, proletariat* have lowered their sights, moved back to take their place with other words; to respond to “contemporary figures of irrational archaism that carry with them death and devastation (55)”; and to take care of a world that is both vulnerable and precarious.

The human sciences are thereby themselves caught up in the circulation of meaning and its polyvalence, because they measure rates of circulation. That is their purpose. At base they are in the service of polls, election predictions, demographic averages, epidemiological rates, tastes and distastes, and all that certainly makes for interesting labour. But this statistical and numerical information has nothing to do with humanity, nor what each absolutely singular being, is about (53).

Nothing to do with humanity? Can they not distinguish, for example, between leisure and labour? draw distinctions between types of labour? determine precisely the labour expended in a woman’s labour? Do they not offer a system of accounts that account for birth? determine its cash-value through formulae for depreciation and replacement costs? But Badiou cuts and slices reality in a different way; the Badiouan registers *science, art, politics* and *love* furnish an understanding of *universal* somewhat orthogonal to that of economic science and its adherents, or so it seems to me.98

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96See Footnotes (13, 70, 71).
97Larry Summers’ World Bank memorandum advocating, on the grounds of economic efficiency, that pollutants be dumped in the poorer world is a wonderful example, it seems to me, of such an accounting; Khan (1994) attempts to grapple with the “science” of it.
98For an introduction to these Badiouan registers, see Badiou (2004) and Hallward (2003, 2004). One of the motivations of this essay is precisely to document for myself Singer’s belief in all that he sees the theorems of economic science as delivering. The reader will have to decide for herself. For the particular/universal dichotomy, see Footnotes (27, 76) and the associated text.
invention, artistic creation, political innovation or the encounter that comprises love. Averages, statistics, sociology, history, demography or polls are not capable of teaching us what the history of truth is (53). We must not allow the global acceptance of themes of liberal economy and representative democracy to dissimulate the fact that the world the twentieth century has given birth to is a violent and fragile world (55).

So the end typically ends the same way, a search not so much for haq and truth, as a search for its history, of the search for a glimpse of it through past attempts at achieving such a glimpse. Badiou keeps to one side “cultural, religious, national and racist passions (55)” and as my epigraph brings out, has not much to do with God—in this sense, in some sense, he is at one with Singer, but his is perhaps a more complex “laying aside”.

III(b)

The advocacy of a new style of and for philosophy revolves around the two words, interruption and retardation, and attempts to break with the past in terms of “colour, tonality and inflection”:

This world is an anarchy of more or less regulated, more or less coded fluxes, wherein money, products and images are exchanged. If philosophy is to sustain its desire in such a world, it must propose a principle of interruption ... must be able to extract itself from this circulation and take possession of itself once again as something other than an object of circulation. It is obvious that such a point of interruption must be an unconditional requirement; that is, something which is submitted to thought with no other consideration than itself and which is neither exchangeable nor capable of being put into circulation (48-49).

Philosophy must extract itself from the world of interest, purpose and khud-gharazi, became bey-gharaz rather than ba-gharaz, possibly find its essentiality in not being easily marketable, if not non-marketable. In articulating purpose, it identify its own purpose; in discussing self-interest, it declare its own interest. Thus, under this reading, rather than concern myself with the motives of Hashwani and of Singer, and focus on their means of livelihood, I ought to focus on my own, grapple first of all with my self, ask how this essay furthers my own career, my self-interest, my desires, and in so doing detracts from the little that may be of use in it, that which may be philosophical sound in it, philosophical as I hear Badiou to be emphasising. Before the other, I must exhort my self, dissipate my psychic need to train and teach the other by teaching and training myself.

99See Footnote (78) on the importance of this word for ethics.
100See for example Badiou’s (2003b) text on St. Paul. Also Footnote (74) above, and the text which it footnotes.
101I note again the double use of the word must; also see Footnotes (78, 99) and the text they footnote.
102For Singer’s emphasis on values that are “sound, defensible and justifiable” see the text footnoted by Footnote (75) above.
103I return to some of the issues raised here in the paragraph that concludes this essay. In so far as my words intrude into the reading of this text, I recognise that it touches a chord in me that the other two texts do not.
Philosophy must propose a retardation process. It must construct a time for thought, which in the face of the injunction to speed, will constitute a time of its own. I consider this a singularity of philosophy; that its thinking is leisurely, because today revolt requires leisureliness and not speed. This thinking, slow and consequently rebellious, is alone capable of establishing the fixed point, whatever it may be, whatever its name may be, which we need in order to sustain the desire of philosophy (51–52).  

Thus, a doctrine for the subject that reaches beyond the three orientations of the subject, one that lies between polarities, finds its truth in the space that lies between a flat yes and an equally flat no, one that negotiates boundaries, deals simultaneously with the presence and the absence of a type or characteristic.

Badiou concludes with what I have taken to be the third epigraph to this essay; unlike Hashwani and Singer, rather than their fellow-citizens, he exhorts philosophy to awake and do its duty, fulfil what is required of it, deliver on its promise, redeem its desire.

**III(c)**

In sum, Badiou’s text is an address to philosophy, to its four-fold desire, its four obstacles, its three orientations with their two commonalities and two illnesses, and finally, an exhortation to philosophy to move from interest and respond to a four-fold need.

**IV**

I began this lecture with a three-sentence quotation from Dr Mahbub-ul-Haq, and I end by returning to it: to his nouns security, concern, weapons, dignity, analysis on the one hand, and child, disease, tension, dissident, spirit on the other; to his verbs is (three times in three sentences), die, spread, explode, silenced, crushed; and to his adjectives human, last, and ethnic. I also return to the other

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104This is the third use of *must* in the Badiou’s texts that I use; see (101) above.
105The notion of “types” and “characteristics”, typically a finite number, pervades the modern theory of games. For a reading of Billy Budd that, if not an antidote, can at least be used to appreciate the power of such an assumption, see Cameron (2005). I hope to present a fuller explication of this idea elsewhere.
106Haq uses the verb is simply to characterise security, to project it to a variety of subspaces; also see Monk (2005, Chapters 1-3) for the importance of the word in analytical philosophy.
107Last as in last analysis. For an emphasis on the identification of a final or ultimate or last analysis in my other texts, see Footnotes (70, 71, 96), and the text they footnote; also the earlier Footnote (13.)
108Human as in human security, human dignity and human spirit, ethnic, as in ethnic tension. For a reference to the importance of the word ethnic in my own consciousness, see the references in Footnotes (11) above.
distinction in my opening, that between the worlds of theory and practice, of the academic and the non-academic, of the unconditional pursuit of conditional learning and the inevitable need for certifying, policing and monitoring, of the theorist and the theoretician, compromising and moving on in the exercise of power, persisting and getting stuck in attempted understandings.109

Dr Haq was not especially interested in the arcane technical issues of technical economics; perhaps, like aircraft, was of the view that Pakistan could afford only maintenance rather than design, focus on redistribution rather than on growth.110 The closest he came to the world of theory was in the design of statistical indices to measure national health.111 Nevertheless, it is unfortunate, and possibly not a coincidence, that he could not grace the first Meeting of The Econometric Society held in Pakistan.112 Perhaps there is a higher level of theory, one that works its way through, rather than over and above, policy. Perhaps, Dr Haq was a theorist in that higher sense, and not the narrower one of the production of killer-theorems.113 Perhaps he had read Iqbal and was influenced by him:

Teri kitabon mein ae hakim-e-mcaash rakha hi kya hai akhir khutoot-e-khamdar ki numaish marez-o-kajdar ki numaish.114

And so to bring this down to the motivations of my own abstract—to understand and theorise regional cooperation, ‘regional’ capaciously interpreted, and ethics, ethics as in the ethics of globalisation—I remind you of the Muslim belief that the “final and most basic analysis”115 must116 be the Qurān. For a

109This distinction between the theorist and the theoretician has been with me ever since I was called upon to comment on the Quaid-i-Azam Lecture delivered by Larry Summers, then of the World Bank, and now of Harvard University, see Khan (1992b,1993b). For a recent return to the same theme, see Khan (2003, 2004a). What is interesting is not how water-tight these boundaries are but in how they enrich each other.

110It is well known that during the regime of stringent foreign exchange control in Pakistan, there was no funding for aeronautical engineering focussed on ‘design’. For the trade-off between “growth and distribution” and the “recognition” that a poor country could not afford both, see Griffin-Khan (1972) and their references.

111See the references to this aspect of his work in Sen (1999).

112In 2003, at Lahore, at LUMS, organised in part by my discussant Professor Asad Zaman, with participation by the President of the Society, Professor Guy Laroque, the distinguished Fisher Lecture being given by Professor John Moore, with a phalanx of distinguished Indian economists, senior and junior, in attendance. Since then Professor Asad Zaman has been elected to the Fellowship of the Society, and to my knowledge, remains the only Pakistani to have attained this honour.

113I think that this phrase is Amartya Sen’s in an interview for which I cannot find the reference.

114See his compilation Zarb-e-Kalim. Perhaps this is the place to record that my Iqbal Memorial Lecture delivered at the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Society in December 1997 remains unpublished, an action for which the responsibility is entirely mine.

115See the recurrence and recycling of this idea in my texts as brought out in Footnotes (13, 70, 71, 96, 92, 107) and the text they footnote; Footnote (107) in particular.

116Other than an explication of a quote from Badiou, this is the first time in this essay that I use the word must; I believe this use to be warranted here. In this connection see Footnotes (78, 99, 101, 104). Also see the repetition of the word in the sentence below.
Muslim, however much she or he learns from Dr Haq, Mr Hashwani, Professor Singer, Professor Badiou, or Iqbal and takes joy in their writing and in their work, the “final” arbiter of the meaning of the words and values they offer, the space to which they have to be projected, has to be the Qurān. It is in the acknowledgement of this, I suppose, that the Annual Meetings of this Society, right from its inception, always begin with a recitation of a passage from the Qurān. This is the Pakistani way. I too shall follow this way, and conclude this Mahbub-ul-Haq Memorial Lecture by reciting Sūrah Al-Asr, Chapter 103, from the Qurān, but in translation:

(i) The flight of time. (ii) Verily, humankind is in loss. (iii) Except those with faith, who do good works, enjoin truth, enjoin patience.

And I shall leave you to think, formalise, reflect, chart-out, calculate, model, compute, determine, resist, to take only a few projections of the word yahsabu, how to celebrate the words amanu, aml-us-salihati, haq, sabr for ethics and cooperation with the other, in your attempts to understand your other, to avoid hubris towards the other, work for the other, attempt love for the other, whether such an other, “atheist scientist, fanatic believer or any other handy label”, be from the North, or the South or the East or the West.

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117 A mention of the Non-Muslim, the Muslim’s other, concludes this paragraph. At this point let me simply say that Sūrah Al-Kafirun, Chapter 109, is one place to learn how the Qurān teaches Muslims how to respond to the Non-Muslim; through a kind of tolerance that is presumably orthogonal to a general dissolving of beliefs in a so-called universal solvent. A comprehensive study of tolerance in the Qurān has yet to be undertaken.

118 For the importance of this word in connection with what ethics could possible be, see Khan (2003); also Monk (2005). I might also point out here the importance of projections in the understanding of poetry, and their relevance to a poet’s ethics in so far as it is different from a theorist’s ethics. For one discussion of “poetic sincerity”, see Everett (1980).

119 It is worth noting here that I subscribe to the principle of the indeterminacy of translation; which is to say that I do, in furnishing to you this translation, in English, what I know that I cannot do, or to put it less imprecisely, I do what I know I can only imperfectly do. For an extended discussion of the difficulties, not to say impossibility, of translation, see Khan (1992a, 1993a, 2004c) and their references.

120 For the other used as a technical term, see Levinas (1969, 1996) and his other writings. Readers of Levinas will justifiably hear their Master in this sentence, and perhaps also hear an implicit plea for toleration. However, a distinguished colleague, an economist by profession, observed to me that he had “nothing against toleration, only that it led to inefficiencies”.


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