%PDF-1.6
%
1 0 obj
<>stream
application/pdfWhat Remains of the Case for Flexible Exchange Rates? (InvitedLecture)In the 1950s and 1960s, there was much support among academiceconomists for abandoning the Bretton Woods System in favour of a systemof flexible exchange rates. Such proposals had their opponents, ofcourse, some of whom, for example Robert Triffin (l960), believed that,if anything. the Bretton Woods System granted too much, rather than toolittle, scope to individual national governments to vary their exchangerates. Nevertheless, at that time, the weight of professional opinionwas against them, and when exchange rate flexibility was adopted in the1970s, economists by and large welcomed it. This change in policy regimewas not, however, the outcome of reforms undertaken in the light ofacademic arguments; although these did have some influence in someplaces, not least the United Kingdom.' Nevertheless, the single mostimportant factor leading to the demise of the Bretton Woods System wasnot the acceptance of any academic arguments about how to make theinternational monetary system function more� smoothly. It was somethingmuch more down to earth, namely the unwillingness of certaingovernments, notably that of West Germany, to accept the balance ofpayments and hence domestic inflationary consequences of United Statesfiscal and monetary policies associated with the Vietnam War.
Acrobat 5.0 Scan Plug-in for Windows; modified using iTextSharp 4.1.6 by 1T3XTWinter 1988,Vol. 27, No.4 Part I
endstream
endobj
2 0 obj
<>/ProcSet[/PDF/ImageB]>>/CropBox[0 0 378.24 588.72]/Parent 5 0 R/Type/Page>>
endobj
3 0 obj
<>stream
q
378.24 0 0 588.72 0 0 cm
/Im1 Do
Q
endstream
endobj
4 0 obj
<>/Filter/CCITTFaxDecode/Width 1576/BitsPerComponent 1/Name/Im1/Height 2453/Decode[1 0]/Subtype/Image/Length 60515/ColorSpace/DeviceGray/Type/XObject>>stream
&Z@K mK+O! ZH,3N`p}'CJd